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At least since the M'Naghten case of the 1840s,' Anglo-
American criminal law has concerned itself closely, famously, and
contentiously with the psychology of the accused. 2 Another significant
body of scholarship addresses the psychology of juries, 3 and other
valuable research has approached some of the rules of criminal
evidence from the perspective of social and cognitive psychology.
4
There has, however, yet to be a general investigation of what social
1. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843) (holding that the insanity
defense excuses crimes committed when defendant, by reason of mental disease or defect, did not
know the nature and quality of the act or did not know that act was wrong).
2. See, e.g., ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); PETER W. LOW ET AL.,
THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1986); MICHAEL
MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1983); NORVAL MORRIS,
MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); STEPHEN J. MORSE, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CRAZINESS
(1986).
3. See, e.g., NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT
ACCIDENTS (2000); NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW
(1995); see also Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 J. PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622 (2001) (reviewing studies).
4. See Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of
Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 526-33 (1991) (rejecting Fundamental Attribution Error, or
"FAE", as justification for exclusion of character evidence to show subsequent conduct); Chris
William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1242-
46 (2001) (same); see also Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the
Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 521-23 (1983) (suggesting FAE as
justification for exclusion of character evidence); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1051, 1087 (2000) (same); Miguel A. Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for a
Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221, 236 (1996) (suggesting that psychological research might
support admission through expert testimony of more specifically-defined behavioral dispositions);
Christopher Slobogin, Race-Based Defenses-The Insights of Traditional Analysis, 54 ARK. L.
REV. 739, 772 n.152 (2002) (noting that expert testimony on race-based defenses might help to
overcome FAE). For a general discussion of FAE, see infra notes 20, 34-47 and accompanying
text.
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cognition research might teach us about the criminal law's pervasive
concern with blameworthiness.
5
This Article undertakes that investigation. It brings research
on the psychology of social cognition to bear on the decision-making
processes of public officials charged with the administration of
criminal justice. The psychological research suggests that these
decision makers, like most other human beings, are likely to
overestimate the causal significance of personal choice, and to
correspondingly underestimate the causal significance of situational
factors in the behavior of others.6 My thesis is that this observer's
tendency to attribute conduct and its consequences to personality,
rather than to situation, has important and disturbing implications
for the theory and practice of criminal law.
I. INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW, QUALIFICATIONS, AND ROADMAP
A. Overview
The idea of culpability or blameworthiness plays a central role
in both the theory and practice of criminal justice. We have it on high
authority that
5. Andrew Lelling has suggested that the psychological research on situation and
personality in determining behavior weighs strongly against character-based theories of
culpability. See generally Andrew E. Lelling, A Psychological Critique of Character-Based
Theories of Criminal Excuse, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 35 (1998). Gilbert Harman has made a
similar argument against virtue ethics generally. See generally Gilbert Harman, The
Nonexistence of Character Traits, 100 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 223 (2000). I am not
convinced that the behavioral research on situation and personality really excludes the existence
of character traits. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. For a defense of virtue ethics along
these lines, see Gopal Sreenivasan, Errors About Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,
111 MIND 47 (2002).
My primary point is cognitive, not behavioral, and, although related, is different and more
powerful. Whatever the role of personality in determining behavior, observers tend to exaggerate
it. Traditional virtue theory, for example, depends not only on the existence of character traits,
but also on the ability of observers to identify and evaluate character traits. I do not believe that
virtue ethics, conceived of in terms of character traits, can be rescued from the implications of
FAE. It would follow that a virtue theory of punishment, such as that defended in Kyron
Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (2000), is
suspect.
Harman does make this cognitive point about virtue ethics, but his discussion is terse and
highly general. See generally Gilbert Harman, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue
Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error, 99 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 315 (1999).
He confines the implications of FAE to a critique of virtue ethics, when it suggests much wider
skepticism about blame and punishment generally, and about criminal justice more particularly.
Id.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 41-65.
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[t]he contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil.
7
There could be no crime, said Blackstone, without a "vicious will."
8
Despite some exceptions, such as strict liability offenses, the principle
that blameworthiness is a distinctive feature of criminal conduct
remains fundamental in our legal culture.
Yet many features of prevailing criminal law are hard to
reconcile with this principle of culpability. For example, a failed
attempt typically is punished more leniently than a successful one,
even though those engaging in failed attempts are no less culpable (or
dangerous) than those who are successful. 9 The felony murder
doctrine departs from the culpability principle in the opposite
direction by imposing liability for murder on account of unintended
killings, even in the absence of culpable recklessness.10 The Pinkerton
doctrine, in similar fashion, imposes accomplice liability on
conspirators for all offenses foreseeably committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy, even though the individual defendant had no
knowledge that such offenses were planned or committed.11 In each of
these instances, the liability of the actor is determined more by moral
luck than by the degree of deliberate wrongdoing. 12
Moreover, the scope of affirmative defenses does not, to put it
mildly, track the culpability principle very consistently. One who kills
in the insane delusion that only death can save the victim from
eternal damnation,1 3 or one who kills when intoxicated beyond self-
7. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
8. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21.
9. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4, at 567 (3d ed. 2000) ("As to statutory
provisions concerning the sentences which may be imposed for all or a broad class of attempts,
the most common in the modern recodifications is that which declares the attempt to be a crime
one degree below the object crime.").
10. See id. at 671-72 (describing felony murder rule).
11. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (upholding convictions both for
conspiracy and for substantive offenses committed after defendant was incarcerated); LAFAVE,
supra note 9, § 6.8(a), at 633-35 (discussing Pinkerton rule).
12. "Moral luck" is a phrase used in moral philosophy to refer to the tension between the
proposition that moral standing should not depend on luck and the widespread intuition that
luck does indeed influence moral standing. See, e.g., Andrew Latus, Moral Luck, THE INTERNET
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/m/moralluc.htm (last visited
Oct. 26, 2003).
13. See Sherry F. Colb, The Andrea Yates Verdict: A Nation in Denial About Mental Illness,
FindLaw's Legal Commentary, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20020327.html (March 27,
[Vol. 56:13831386
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control (and in many jurisdictions even beyond awareness of his
actions),1 4 can be held just as liable as one who kills with sane and
sober calculation. Yet for centuries the law has reduced murder to
manslaughter when the killer is provoked by such affronts as a
spouse's infidelity. 15  More recently, courts have shown some
receptiveness to defenses based on wrongs done by the victim to the
accused-the now-familiar claim of an "abuse excuse."1 6  The
entrapment defense, in all its forms, exculpates blameworthy actors
lured into committing a crime by government agents.
17
These anomalies are sometimes thought to reflect imperative
needs for social control at the expense of fairness.' 8 Sometimes they
are thought to reflect normative disagreements about the degree of
culpability properly attaching to various forms of conduct.' 9 Without
2002) (discussing murder conviction of Andrea Yates, who drowned her children while mentally
ill in the belief that only death could save their souls). An insane belief that God has commanded
the specific crime can exculpate the accused under the so-called "deific decree" doctrine, but the
doctrine is understood as a narrow exception to the usual limits of the insanity defense. Schmidt
v. State, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (N.Y. 1915) (Cardozo, J.) (recognizing deific decree doctrine in
dictum); Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, "God Told Me to Kill": Religion or Delusion?, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 973 (2001) (surveying deific decree cases).
14. A substantial minority of American jurisdictions hold the defendant responsible even
when, on account of voluntary intoxication, he lacks the intent or knowledge required by the
definition of the charged offense. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 48 n.2 (plurality opinion)
(1996) (noting that ten states do not permit intoxication to negative intent or knowledge). The
majority of jurisdictions, moreover, deny any defense based on intoxication when the charged
crime requires recklessness or negligence. See LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 4.10(c), at 416.
15. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 7.10(b), at 707 ("It is the law practically everywhere
that a husband who discovers his wife in the act of committing adultery is reasonably provoked,
so that when, in his passion, he intentionally kills either his wife or her lover (or both), his crime
is voluntary manslaughter rather than murder." (footnote omitted)).
16. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994) (attaching "abuse excuse"
label to use of expert testimony calculated to shift responsibility from the accused to her or his
past abuses and strongly criticizing this practice).
17. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1992) (holding that, under
subjective federal entrapment defense, proof that government induced offense is not rebutted by
proof that defendant engaged in similar conduct at time when conduct was not illegal). What
result if Jacobson had claimed that his possession of child pornography was attributable to
sexual obsession rather than government temptation? Lacking some human agent to shoulder
the blame, he would not even have been allowed to present this theory to the jury.
18. As Professor Morse says, discussing Egelhoff, "[cloncern with culpability thus almost
always conflicts with concern for public safety." Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from
Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 250, 256 (1998).
19. There is, for example, a lively debate about whether provocations such as spousal
infidelity or homosexual advance reduce the culpability of killings, as supposed by the voluntary
manslaughter category. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some
Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002); Joshua Dressler, When
"Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances,
and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995); Emily L. Miller,
(Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J.
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purporting to reject such accounts completely, this Article explores a
different kind of explanation-one rooted in modern research findings
of social psychology.
Psychological research indicates that observers tend to hold the
individual, rather than the situation, responsible for the individual's
action.20 Although people tend to attribute their own misconduct to
external constraints, they tend to attribute the behavior of others to
personality rather than context. Psychologists regard this tendency-
variously termed the correspondence bias or fundamental attribution
error (henceforth FAE)-as firmly established. 21 It may not prevail, or
prevail only to a lesser extent, in non-Western cultures. There is no
consensus about what causes FAE. But about the basic phenomenon
there is little doubt. It is commonsensical for observers to conclude
that other individuals chose as they did, not because of the situations
those individuals were in, but because of the kind of people they are.
Common sense, however, turns out to be wrong.
As a descriptive matter, FAE helps to explain many puzzling
features of existing criminal law. For example, theorists have
experienced considerable difficulty explaining the more lenient
treatment accorded failed as compared to successful attempts. The
distinction may reflect a cognitive tendency rather than a normative
anomaly; decision makers may irrationally but consistently attribute
failure and success to the actor rather than to the circumstances. The
same type of tendency may in part explain both the felony murder
doctrine and the expansive view taken in some of the proximate cause
cases.
665 (2001); Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as
Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133 (1992).
20. See infra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. Terminology such as "bias" and "error"
implies deviation from an identifiable norm of rationality. It is by no means clear that social
cognition really departs from such an identifiable norm. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Taking
Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of
Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1943 (2002). It may be more precise to speak of cognitive
tendencies rather than biases, or of information-processing strategies rather than errors. The
foundational literature in this area, however, uses the "fundamental attribution error" label, and
that nomenclature has become so settled as to render other terminology potentially confusing.
In the paper that follows, I shall use FAE as a term of art to refer to the demonstrated tendency
of observers to attribute conduct and consequences to person rather than situation. In many
places, jurists have failed to articulate a rational justification for legal doctrines that can be
explained as products of overassessing personal as distinct from situational factors in the stream
of events that led to a negative outcome. When generations of scholars have tried and failed to
identify a convincing rational justification for such doctrines, it seems fair to regard the decision
process that produced them not only as partly determined by cognitive predispositions, but as
erroneously determined to that extent.
[Vol. 56:13831388
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FAE also suggests, contrary to the popular impression that
abuse excuses have undermined the law's assumption of free will, that
legislators, courts, and juries will likely define the grounds of excuse
too narrowly when the claimed excuse is rooted in purely situational
factors rather than third-party wrongdoing. The legal indifference to
the defendant's intoxication,22 the widespread doctrine that reckless or
negligent mistake about the facts supporting a defense bars that
defense completely, 23 and the abandonment of the behavioral prong of
the insanity defense, 24 all reflect the judgment that the individual,
rather than the situation, caused the harm the law aims to prevent.
Social and cognitive psychology teaches us to distrust that judgment.
Each of these doctrines should be reconsidered with a healthy dose of
skepticism about intuitive judgments regarding personal
responsibility.
When, by contrast, the defendant invites the court to blame
another individual, the psychological dynamic changes. The
provocation defense to murder is an ancient example; the abuse
excuse is a more modern counterpart. Entrapment, too, involves
wrongdoing by players other than the accused. In rape cases, the jury
may be encouraged to blame the victim for sexual activity. This may
very well translate into an irrational inference of consent from the
victim's character.
As a normative matter, FAE has two distinct and largely
alternative implications. The first is that FAE should be recognized as
a standing risk in legal decision making. Policy analysts should take a
hard look at both prevailing doctrine and proposed reforms with some
appreciation of the cognitive tendency to hold persons rather than
situations accountable for bad outcomes. Rule-drafters and judges
should handle trial procedures with a similar awareness.
The second implication is that if, as seems not unlikely,
cognitive defects are relatively immune to rational correction, the old
debate over retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment should
be seen as both more complicated and more important than hitherto. 25
Efforts to institutionalize retributive theory are complicated by the
standing risk, reflected in some strands of prevailing law, of
overassessing blameworthiness. Unchecked, FAE may mean that
retributive theory in practice will inflict punishment out of proportion
to a rational measurement of just deserts. Legislators, judges, and
22. See infra text accompanying note 121-122.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 123-125.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 99-112.
25. For general treatments of the philosophy of punishment, see infra note 151.
2003] 1389
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juries following intuitive notions of blameworthiness will tend to
overassess individual responsibility and underassess situational
factors. It follows that a system based on retributivism will, in
practice, tend to overpunish, even according to retributive criteria. To
the extent that utilitarianism relies on common sense assessments of
blameworthiness to limit punishment, utilitarians too must grapple
with the challenge posed by FAE.
FAE's implications for the theoretical debate, however, are not
entirely one-sided. Positive or mandatory retributivist theorists, who
believe that culpable wrongdoing is a necessary and sufficient reason
for punishment, may well have second thoughts about
institutionalizing a theory that requires punishment according to
what in practice will be exaggerated assessments of blameworthiness.
Permissive retributivists should be less discomfited, because they
believe that blameworthiness only authorizes but does not require
punishment.26 According to this view, exaggerated assessments of
blameworthiness would translate into actual punishment only if
pragmatic considerations counseled punishing to the limits set by
those assessments. This would still be a disturbing risk, given the
priority retributivists typically place on avoiding undeserved
punishment.
The utilitarian theorist is in much the same boat as the
permissive retributivist. Typical utilitarian theories accept the idea
that culpability is a necessary condition of punishment. The
utilitarians recognize culpability-based side-constraints because
otherwise their theory might justify punishment of the innocent,
recognition of strict liability, imposition of cruel punishments, and
indeed anything else that would deliver a favorable balance of
consequences. If decision makers tend to exaggerate culpability,
however, the utilitarian, like the permissive retributivist, runs a
standing risk of punishing in excess of what her side-constraints
would permit if rationally applied.
Not only does the debate become more complicated, it also
becomes more important. If it is possible to reduce the influence of
FAE, retributivists could conceivably find themselves in dogged
disagreement with their utilitarian colleagues. If the level of
punishment now prevalent is justified by a favorable balance of
consequences, and current assessments of culpability are overstated,
retributive theory would require reductions in punishment that are
inconsistent with social welfare. The comforting consistency of
26. For more on the distinction between permissive and mandatory retributivism, see infra
note 156.
1390 [Vol. 56:1383
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utilitarian and retributive theories with respect to most practical
issues may be a cognitive illusion.
B. Qualifications
Before proceeding to substantiate the argument, I would like to
distinguish four propositions I regard as mistaken, but which might
easily be confused with the position I am defending. I am not, in the
first place, making a relativistic or deterministic claim that no one can
be justly blamed for anything.27 My claim is not that personality never
determines behavior, but only that observers are likely to
overestimate the extent to which this is the case.
Second, I am not making an elitist claim that decisions about
responsibility should be made by psychologists rather than jurors, or
by judges rather than legislators. 28 The correspondence bias does not
disappear in professional bureaucrats. 29 What the law needs to do is
27. For the manifesto of pure behaviorism, see B.F. Skinner, BEYOND FREEDOM AND
DIGNITY (1971).
28. One persistent theme in Professor Finkel's work is that "law" and "commonsense
justice" diverge and that "commonsense justice" often has the advantage over "law." See, e.g.,
FINKEL, supra note 3, at 319-37. Jurors, however, are surely subject to cognitive predispositions
such as FAE, as Professor Finkel has recognized. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense
Justice, Psychology, and the Law: Prototypes that are Common, Senseful, and Not, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 461, 477-78 (1997) (noting that capital-sentencing procedures may exacerbate
rather than reduce FAE). Finkel's point is less that jurors are better than other decision makers
than that they are at least no worse. "If people have a dispositional nature, bias, or penchant
and the social psychological evidence for this is persuasive, in my opinion, then, social scientists
are not exempt." Id.
Two features of Finkel's work call for comment here. First, he understands "the law" as
exogenous, rather like an inscribed totem that came from nowhere. The enacted law, however, is
made, by legislators with an eye on the same community that generates Finkel's "commonsense
justice," and by judges both appointed and elected. The doctrinal features Finkel finds arbitrary
or random-felony murder, provocation, and insanity-may very well be the systematic products
of cognitive bias operating on legislators, judges, and voters. See FINKEL, supra note 3, at 154-71
(discussing felony murder); id. at 297-318 (discussing provocation); id. at 261-297 (discussing
insanity).
Second, Finkel pays little or no attention to those cases in which community sentiment
agrees with the enacted law. The fact is that a conviction can be upheld on appeal only if the jury
and the judges agree. The reported cases therefore provide considerable evidence that juries are
not wildly out of step with the positive law.
29. For example, in their study of popular attitudes toward prevailing legal doctrine,
Robinson and Darley found that the subjects opposed equating the penalties for attempted and
completed offenses, but also were sympathetic to treating killings during felonies as
manslaughter rather than murder. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY,
AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 27 (1995) ("In the view of our
subjects ... the level of punishment for attempt ought to be significantly less than that for the
completed offense."); id. at 180 ("But according to our subjects, current doctrine goes too far, for it
punishes such a negligent killing as if it were murder, although the subjects would prefer to
punish it as manslaughter."). In the case of punishment for attempts, popular opinion can be
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not change the decision makers, but account for the risk that decision
makers will overestimate personal as opposed to situational factors.
Third, FAE is not a phenomenon that inevitably disfavors the
accused. For example, the exaggeration of personal, relative to
situational, factors helps to explain the lenience accorded failed
attempts. Affirmative defenses that cast blame on the victim or the
police offer another pro-defendant example. Defenses such as
provocation and entrapment may derive some of their popularity from
the tendency to exaggerate personal, as distinct from situational,
explanations for behavior and its consequences. My thesis holds that
the law should recognize FAE as a systemic tendency to find someone
responsible when harm occurs. Although that someone will generally
be the accused, this is by no means invariably the case.
Finally, attributing conduct and results to personality rather
than situation is not inevitable. Overassessing personal responsibility
is a risk, not a certainty. Some of the doctrinal rules that FAE might
help to explain are in fact minority positions in American
jurisdictions. The doctrinal anomalies FAE helps to explain, moreover,
may also derive support from other considerations, some perfectly
rational. Thus, recognizing our common tendency in favor of personal
responsibility would not automatically translate into doctrinal change.
We would, however, analyze doctrine with greater skepticism about
assessments of personal responsibility.
C. Roadmap
Part II summarizes the relevant research findings in social
psychology. Parts III and IV suggest that some puzzling features of
current doctrine may be due in part to pervasive cognitive tendencies.
Part III examines the "moral luck" problem in the contexts of attempt,
felony murder, and conspiracy, and argues that FAE may explain the
law's preoccupation with harm actually caused rather than with
dangerousness or wickedness manifested by conduct. Part IV analyzes
the defenses, and suggests that FAE may help to explain the law's
more generous response to defenses based on victim misconduct than
to those based on situational factors such as insanity and intoxication.
It may well be that most novel claims of situational excuse deserve to
be rejected; ultimately, each must be judged on its own merits. In the
process of judging, however, we should do what we can to account for
interpreted as attributing outcome (the failed attempt) to personality rather than situation, as
predicted by research on FAE. In the case of felony murder, however, it is popular opinion that
inclines toward mitigating the current felony murder rule, which attributes outcomes to
personality automatically without any inquiry into mens rea.
1392 [Vol. 56:1383
FUNDAMENTAL RETRIBUTION ERROR
our tendency to focus on the defendant's behavior rather than on the
situation.
Part V takes up the normative issues related to FAE. The
criminal justice system should do what it can to recognize and resist
FAE. It seems likely, however, that the cognitive tendencies at work
cannot be completely dispelled. In that case, the psychological
research on attribution has normative implications for criminal law
theory's concern with blameworthiness. Agency, responsibility, and
causation are the wellsprings of blameworthiness; the psychological
research indicates that people are prone to overestimate agency,
responsibility, and causation. Part V explores these implications,
expressing some skepticism about theories that require, rather than
permit, punishment according to desert. Part VI briefly responds to
two plausible criticisms: defense of the rational-actor assumption and
reservations predicated on the risks attending law-office psychology.
The Article aims primarily at explaining otherwise puzzling
divergences between prevailing theory and prevailing practice. For the
most part, specific doctrinal recommendations are not advanced. My
ultimate claim, then, is neither for nor against specific rules or
procedures, but rather a plea for broader awareness that those
assessing criminal responsibility are, like those they judge, human-
all too human.
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
PERSONAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS IN EXPLAINING EVENTS
A. Personality and Situation as Sources of Human Behavior
Human behavior, like other phenomena, is subject to
causation. A rich psychological literature addresses the respective
causal power of individual personality and impersonal situations on
the resulting behavior. As we shall see, the current state of the
research is, for criminal law purposes, less important than it might
seem. But, the personality-situation literature very helpfully frames
the issue posed to criminal law by FAE.
People very commonly attribute conduct to character traits.
We blame the fight on the bully, the accident on the klutz, the divorce
on the skirt-chaser, and so on. Ordinary language includes thousands
of words for character traits, which suggests just how commonly
2003] 1393
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people reason from individual proclivities to actual behavior. 30 Early
in the twentieth century, leading psychologists accepted trait theory
as a valid description of human behavior.31 Their efforts to confirm the
predictive power of character traits, however, had the opposite effect.32
Situation may not be the exclusive determinant of behavior, but the
causal significance of character traits defined as generally as
"pugnacious" or "dishonest" is much weaker than commonsense trait
theory suggests. 33
The psychological research on behavior supports three basic
findings. First, individual responses to specific situations are
reasonably consistent across time.3 4 If subject A cheats on an
examination given one opportunity, A is likely to cheat on a similar
exam if given another opportunity.35 This finding, obviously, doesn't
contradict trait theory.
The second finding is that individual behavior is not consistent
across situations.36 The fact that A cheats on an examination does not
30. See G.W. Allport & H.S. Odbert, Traitnames: A Psycho-lexical Study, 47 PSYCHOL.
MONOGRAPHS 171-220 (1936).
31. See LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 90-118 (1991).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION 417-18 (1999).
Yet the handful of studies that have risen to the challenge over the last seven
decades or so have yielded remarkably similar conclusions: People often
behave quite consistently when they encounter the same situation at different
times, but there is very little consistency in their trait-related behavior from
one situation to other, different situations. More technically, the temporal
stability of trait-related behaviors is high, but their cross-situational
consistency is low.
Id. (citation omitted).
35. See, e.g., ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 31, at 101 (1991).
Stability coefficients-the correlation between two measures of the same
behavior on different occasions-often exceed .40, sometimes reaching much
higher. For example Hartshorne and May (1928) found that the tendency to
copy from an answer key on a general information test on one occasion was
correlated .79 with copying from an answer key on a similar test six months
later. Newcomb (1929) found that talkativeness at lunch was a highly stable
attribute; it just wasn't very highly correlated with talkativeness on other
occasions (see also Buss & Craik 1983, 1984). [Walter] Mischel insisted that
strong differences between people were apparently limited to specific
responses to specific situations, for example, friendliness in the lunchroom or
willingness to confront one's employer, not broad, cross-situational,
extroversion or assertiveness.
Id.
36. See generally WALTER W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT (1968); DONALD R.
PETERSON, THE CLINICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1968). Ross and Nisbett summarize the
research results as follows:
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justify a prediction that A will steal unguarded property. It has been
suggested that, given a large sample of prior behavior and
appropriately qualified definitions of the relevant traits, personality
can be used to predict behavior. 37 It still seems fair to say that the
traits described by ordinary language-dishonesty, pugnacity,
loquaciousness-describe behavioral propensities too broadly. Our
intuitions about general character and behavior are, shortly put,
incorrect.
The third finding is that individual responses to specific
situations are surprisingly consistent across persons. In the notorious
Milgram experiments, for instance, sixty-eight percent of the subjects
inflicted what they were led to believe were extremely painful and
dangerous electric shocks.38  The Stanford prison experiment,
conducted in the 1970's, similarly showed that an extreme
environment could produce antisocial behavior in ordinary subjects. 39
It is comforting to think that one's self could never become a
murderer, a torturer, a rapist, or a drug dealer. No doubt there are
persons whose internal controls dominate situational factors. The
empirical evidence, however, seems to suggest that such highly ethical
individuals are the exception rather than the norm.
Nonetheless, both personality and situation influence behavior.
If (for instance) a trait and a behavioral response to a situation have a
correlation coefficient of .20, seventy percent of those with the trait
will engage in the behavior while only fifty percent of those without
the trait will engage in the behavior. The ascendant view in
psychology is now "interactionism," and holds unsurprisingly that
both personality and situation play important roles in causing human
behavior.40
the average correlation between different behavioral measures specifically
designed to tap the same personality trait (for example, impulsivity, honesty,
dependency, and the like) was typically in the range between .10 and .20, and
often was even lower .... Correlations between scores on personality scales
designed to measure a given trait and behavior in any particular situations
presumed to tap that trait rarely exceeded the .20 to .30 range.)
Ross & NISBETT, supra note 31, at 95.
37. ROSS & NISBETr, supra note 31, at 107-17.
38. Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371
(1963).
39. See Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT'L J.
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69 (1973).
40. See, e.g., Lelling, supra note 5, at 86-87. Lelling notes the influence of both factors:
Trait psychologists and situationists continue to debate the poinc, but by now
there is general agreement within the field that while behavior is undeniably
influenced by the surrounding environmental context, traits, that is, stable,
2003] 1395
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
We do not need to make any generalized assessment of the
relative causal power of personality and situation to understand the
implications of FAE for criminal justice. Most of the time, the
situational determinants of crime are not exculpatory. The purse-
snatcher commits robbery only in response to an apparently
vulnerable victim and only in the absence of the police. Such
situational factors earn the purse-snatcher no moral points.
Not infrequently, however, the criminal defendant claims that
he responded to a situation that does earn moral points for the
defendant. He may claim, for example, that he behaved as he did in
response to duress, insanity, intoxication, or entrapment. Typical
people, such a defendant argues, do not commit robbery simply
because they encounter a vulnerable victim in the absence of the
police. But, typical people would commit crimes similar to those with
which I am charged if they found themselves in the situation that
confronted me. If the situation that caused the defendant's behavior is
morally exculpatory, criminal justice decision makers must attribute
the defendant's conduct and/or its consequences to the defendant
himself or to the situation. Attribution to the defendant implies guilt;
attribution to the exculpatory situational factors implies innocence or
at least mitigation.
Human beings, however, are not very good at making such
attributions. The next section takes up the research supporting this
tendency to exaggerate personality relative to situation.
B. Fundamental Attribution Error
The research just discussed recognizes that both personality
and situation matter in determining behavior. Different people do
respond differently to similar situations, although the differences in
response appear to be less than that supposed by trait theory.
Research on human cognition, however, adds another set of findings
relevant to criminal law. The gist of these findings is that observers
tend to attribute behavior and its consequences to personality rather
than to situation.
41
internal dispositions affecting behavior across different situations, do exist.
They just play a far smaller role in human behavior than generally believed.
Id. (footnotes omitted); accord Davies, supra note 4, at 518 ("The trait-versus-situation
controversy in the field of personality and social psychology has produced widespread agreement
that behavior is simultaneously a function of disposition and situation, and their mutual
interaction." (footnote omitted)).
41. See, e.g., FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 57-62 (2000) (discussing studies and considering
possible sources of FAE); KUNDA, supra note 34, at 428-32 (discussing studies and concluding:
"In sum, we make the fundamental attribution error, overattributing behavior to dispositions
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In one now-classic experiment, the experimenters asked the
subjects to identify the true opinion held by writers or speakers on
controversial topics-in the original experiment, essays attacking or
defending Fidel Castro.42 When told that the essay writers had freely
chosen their position, the subjects understandably attributed a pro-
Castro view to the authors of the pro-Castro essays. 43 But when the
subjects were told that the essay writers had been given no choice over
the point of view they were assigned to defend, the subjects still
tended to attribute the viewpoint expressed in the essay to the
author.44 The observers, in other words, ascribed behavior to the
person even when they had been informed of a powerful situational
constraint.
In another experiment, observers were asked to rate the
intelligence of participants in a quiz game. 45 The observers tended to
rate the person asking the questions as more intelligent than the
players attempting to answer, even though participants were assigned
roles randomly and even though it should have been obvious that the
person asking the questions could exploit personal areas of specialized
knowledge. 46 In still another experiment, subjects were asked to
evaluate the abilities of two groups of basketball players assigned to
shoot free throws, one group in a well-lit gymnasium and the other
group in a dimly lit facility.47 Naturally enough, the players in the
good lighting made a higher percentage of shots than those in the
more dimly lit gym; nonetheless, the observers tended to rank those
players with higher shooting percentages as better players
notwithstanding the situational difference. 48
and underattributing it to situations because we often do not appreciate the power of
situations."); ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 31, at 125-33 (describing studies; concluding, at 133,
"People readily make trait ascriptions from data that permit only a situational interpretation or,
at most, the interpretation that the actor behaves in a particular way in a particular type of
situation."); Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 21 (1995) (reviewing studies).
42. See Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1967).
43. The subjects' responses to the essays were rated on a scale from 10 (extremely anti-
Castro) to 70 (extremely pro-Castro). Id. at 5. When told the authors chose their positions
voluntarily, the mean attribution was 59.62 for pro-Castro essay writers and 17.38 for anti-
Castro essay writers. Id. at 6. In the no-choice condition the attributions were 44.10 and 22.87
respectively. Id.
44. Id. For discussion, see ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 31, at 126.
45. See KUNDA, supra note 34, at 429-30.
46. Lee Ross et al., Social Roles, Social Control, and Biases in Social-Perception Processes,
35 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 485 (1977). For discussion, see KUNDA, supra note 34, at 428-
30.




Moreover, the size of the effect of FAE appears to be
substantial. That is to say, not only do the studies show statistically
significant results in the sense that chance is unlikely to explain the
results, the studies also show that the magnitude by which observers
exaggerate the causal power of personality is large. 49 In the original
Fidel Castro experiment, the subjects' perceptions of the essay writers'
attitudes toward Castro were measured on a scale from 10 (most anti-
Castro) to 70 (most pro-Castro). 50 When observers were told that the
writers chose their own position, the mean score those observers gave
to the pro-Castro writers was 59.62 and to the anti-Castro writers was
17.38.51 Those observers who were told that the positions had been
assigned still produced mean scores of 44.10 for the pro-Castro writers
and 22.87 for the anti-Castro writers.52 "Perhaps the most striking
result of the ... experiment was the tendency to attribute
correspondence between behavior and private attitude even when the
direction of the essay was assigned."
53
In the quiz master experiment, observers were asked to rate
the general knowledge of the participants. 54 Since assignment to the
roles of quiz master and contestant was random, one would have
expected the ratings to be approximately equal. Observers, however,
rated the questioners with a score almost 70% higher than the level of
the contestants. 55 In another study, researchers asked the subjects to
predict which of two persons would behave more honestly on a future
occasion, given that one had behaved less honestly than the other on a
prior occasion. 56 "The actual correctional between behaviors in any two
situations tapping traits such as honesty or friendliness is at best .15,
yet participants believed it to be close to .80."57
Actors have different cognitive predispositions than observers.
Actors tend to attribute their failures to situational constraints rather
than to personality, and their successes to personality rather than to
the situation.58 This tendency may not result solely from self-
49. For a discussion of the difference between statistical significance and effect size, see
ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 31, at 21.
50. See Jones & Harris, supra note 42, at 5.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 7.
54. See KUNDA, supra note 34, at 430.
55. Id. (observers rated questioners at 82.9 and contestants at 48.9).
56. Id. at 433-34.
57. Id.
58. See Ross & NISBETT, supra note 31, at 140-41 (reviewing studies, concluding "[r]ampant
dispositionism is kept in check when it is the self that is in question."); Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff
Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social
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sympathy. There is some evidence that the actor-observer differences
result from the operation of an availability heuristic. The actor must
both observe the situation and respond to it; the observer needs only
observe.
59
Even when people know that the behavior of others results
from context rather than personal choice, they tend to attribute
behavior to personality. This may, for instance, help to explain why
readers may be skeptical of the situationist critique of trait theory.
Even if trait theory turned out to have more power than current
research supports, however, FAE would suggest that observers tend to
overstate the degree to which personality traits determine behavior.
As Professor Feigenson has explained, FAE implies that
observers tend not just to attribute behavior to personality, but also to
attribute undesirable consequences to behavior rather than to
circumstances.6 0 Observers resist the conclusion that serious harm
might have resulted from chance rather than from wrongdoing. When
harm has occurred, this tendency is magnified by the desire to believe
Inference: A Biased Hypothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
297, 298 (1987) (noting a "well-replicated finding that people tend to make dispositional
attributions for their successes and situational attributions for their failures").
59. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 31, at 141. Ross and Nisbett describe observers' perceptions
of the world by noting that "[p]eople are active, dynamic, and interesting; and these are the
stimulus properties that direct attention. The situation, in contrast, is normally relatively static
and known only hazily." Id. at 139.
60. FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 59. Feigenson argues that
The fundamental attribution error should dispose jurors to find that accidents
are due to someone's negligence, that "someone's to blame." Assume that no
one is responsible for the accident, in the sense that no one is at fault. The
accident "just happened." This amounts to saying, of each party, that there is
no good reason to expect that party to have acted differently to avoid the
accident. Under the circumstances, anyone else would have behaved the same
way. The fundamental attribution error, by contrast, attributes the actor's
behavior to his or her personality, to something "in" the actor, rather than to
the circumstances. This is tantamount to saying that some substantial
percentage of others would have acted differently under the circumstances. (If
most others would have acted the same way as the actor did, then the
attribution, logically, would have to be to the circumstances, because nothing
"in" the actor led him or her to act differently from the norm.)
Id. Feigenson is talking about tort, not crime, but FAE's tendency to exclude claims of
situational excuse and impose liability for bad moral luck would seem to transfer precisely to the
criminal context.
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that the world is basically just6 1 and that unlikely events that in fact
occur were more likely ex ante than in fact they were.
62
Psychologists disagree about the underlying cause of FAE.
63
Evidence that FAE is less pronounced in non-Western cultures also
clouds the picture. 64 For purposes of American criminal law, however,
these intriguing issues need not divert us. We are concerned with
decision makers in a Western legal system. If they are likely to
overassess personal responsibility, we need to account for that
tendency, whatever its cause and whether or not a similar
predisposition operates in other cultures. I do not deny the
universality of principles of justice. I claim only that efforts to
institutionalize principles of justice should take due account of the
cognitive tendencies of those who will operate the institutions.
If we put the situationist critique of trait theory together with
the research on FAE, the resulting description of human behavior and
cognition is thoroughly disturbing for anyone concerned with criminal
justice. The law describes criminal behavior as the free choice of
deviant individuals, when in fact human behavioral responses to
specific situations vary less across persons than is commonly
supposed. 65 Worse yet, because of FAE, observers tend to attribute
conduct to personality even when faced with facts that clearly indicate
that the behavior was controlled by the situation. Standard accounts
of criminal justice call on observers to evaluate the personal
responsibility of the accused for harm caused. Observers, however,
will not be able to perform this task in a completely rational way.
Quite the contrary; observers-whether legislators, police and
61. On the tendency to believe in a just world, see MELVIN J. LERNER, BELIEF IN A JUST
WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION (1980). Given a just world, human suffering needs to be
blamed on human wrongdoing-a psychic need that can be satisfied by blaming the victim
instead of the perpetrator, but which in any event tends to minimize impersonal causes of
negative events.
62. FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 62 ("The hindsight bias is the tendency to overestimate the
probability of a known outcome and the ability of decision makers to have foreseen it .... The
hindsight bias is one of the most consistently replicated effects in the cognitive psychology
literature and has proved fairly resistant to attempts to reduce its impact." (citations omitted)).
63. See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 34, at 441-43 (speculating about possible causes, including
the focus of Western culture on personality traits, leading observers to view and remember
others through the light of earlier experiences with those individuals, and the fact that while a
given observer may see another individual in many different situations, all of those situations
have in common the observer's presence); ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 31, at 139-40 (speculating
about possible causes).
64. See FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 58 n.15 ("Cross-cultural research, moreover, indicates
that the bias toward dispositional attributions may derive from broader cultural meaning
systems, for example, the Western emphasis on individualism, rather than from more or less
universal cognitive processes." (citations omitted)).
65. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
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prosecutors, judges, or jurors-will be predisposed toward attributing
conduct and its consequences to personality.
III. EXPLAINING THE LAW'S EMPHASIS ON ACTUAL RESULTS
Whether we regard the culpability principle as the reason for
punishment, as retributivists do, or as a side-constraint on the pursuit
of collective advantage, as utilitarians do, we will have difficulty
explaining the various situations in which the positive criminal law
varies the punishment for wrongdoing according to its actual
consequences. 66 At least three prominent and heavily criticized
doctrinal anomalies turn on such assessments of harm actually
caused.
First, one who attempts but fails to commit an offense is
generally subject to a lesser penalty than one who attempts and
succeeds. 67 Sometimes the difference in punishment is dramatic; for
example, no American jurisdiction authorizes the death penalty for
attempted murder. 68 Yet it is hard to explain why one whose attempt
66. For some general treatments of the significance of resulting harm for purposes of
evaluating blameworthiness, see, for example, Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law
and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974). See generally Symposium, Harm vs. Culpability: Which Should
Be the Organizing Principle of the Criminal Law?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994).
67. See, e.g., LAFAvE, supra note 9, § 6.4, at 567.
Considerable variation is to be found across the country concerning the
authorized penalties for attempt. As to statutory provisions concerning the
sentences which may be imposed for all or a broad range of attempts, the most
common in the modern recodifications is that which declares the attempt to be
a crime one degree below the object crime. Another common provision
establishes categories according to the severity of the penalty for the
completed crime and specifies a range of penalties for attempts to commit
crimes within each category. Some merely provide that the penalty for
attempt may be as great as for the completed crime. As to statutes dealing
with attempts to commit particular crimes, the authorized punishment is
usually lower than for the completed crime, but in some instances the same or
even a higher punishment is possible.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
68. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 819 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Justice O'Connor noted
the narrowness of the distinction between a failed and a successful attempt:
In the death penalty context, no State authorizes infliction of the penalty for
attempted murder, yet the criminal defendant who has attempted to kill
another human being has the same mental state as the actual killer. Indeed,
as Justice Scalia noted in dissent in Booth, the difference between murder and
attempted murder may often hinge on a fortuity over which the defendant has
no control at all. The only distinction is the harm to the community which
results from the defendant's actions, and this distinction is deemed sufficient
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1383
miscarries deserves lesser punishment than one whose attempt
succeeds.
For example, A and B both shoot their victims. A's victim
receives ordinary medical care but dies nonetheless. B's victim
happens to fall at the feet of a military surgeon with great experience
in dealing with gunshot wounds, and survives as a result. A and B
have acted with equal wickedness. On the face of their conduct they
are equally dangerous (unless one supposes that B might have a
continuing animus against his victim, who, having survived, makes B
more of a risk than A).
The great weight of serious scholarship, including the highly
influential ALI Model Penal Code, treats the attempt/success
distinction as unjustifiable.6 9 How then has it survived in positive
law? FAE offers a powerful explanation. Legislators (and voters)70
tend to attribute success or failure to the person, not the situation.
71
to support a difference in punishment between a sentence of years and the
ultimate penalty."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
69. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 3-20
(1994) (defending culpability vis a vis harm caused as determining blameworthiness); Kadish,
supra note 66, at 680 (arguing that the harm doctrine is not "rationally supportable" meaning
that "it is a doctrine that does not serve the crime preventive purposes of the criminal law, and is
not redeemed by any defensible normative principle"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962) (generally equating attempts with completed offenses in applicable
penalties). The MPC, however, makes two concessions to the significance of harm actually
caused. First, section 5.05(1) provides that an attempt to commit a capital crime is not itself
capital, and section 5.05(2) provides that an inherently improbable attempt may, in the
discretion of the court, be mitigated or excused altogether. Id.
Michael Moore, who himself defends the role of moral luck in current law, writes that since
the promulgation of the MPC, "many criminal law theoreticians who have addressed the issue
have concurred [with the ALI view], including Joel Feinberg, Stephen Schulhofer, Richard
Parker, Michael Zimmerman, Hyman Gross, Andrew Ashworth, Judith Thomson, Steven
Sverdlik, Lawrence Becker, James Gobert, Nicholas Rescher, and Sanford Kadish." Michael S.
Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237,
239-40 (1994) (footnotes omitted). Moore describes opposition to the harm doctrine as "the
standard educated view." Id. at 238. He presents an impressive resume of unsuccessful attempts
to justify prevailing doctrine's emphasis on actual results. See id. at 241-51. His case for
grading culpable acts according to the harm caused rests primarily on intuitions about the
degree of resentment and guilt felt in the wake of harmful and unharmful attempts or risk-
takings. See id. at 263-71. Moore takes these intuitions as data points for the method of
reflective equilibrium; the psychological research suggests that these same intuitions are due to
cognitive predispositions entitled to no presumption of correctness.
70. Note again that the success/attempt distinction is one of the cases in which Robinson's
and Darley's lay subjects rejected the MPC, aligning themselves with prevailing positive law.
See supra note 29.
71. For the application of cognitive psychology to legislative decisions, see Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 549, 564-68 (2002). For a critique arguing that the psychological research does
not yet permit normative prescriptions, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
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Ignoring the fortuitous nature of the handy surgeon in B's case, the
law determines whether to reward or punish B and A simply based on
their moral luck.
72
A second widely criticized doctrine that bases liability on harm
actually caused is the felony murder rule. The rule holds all
participants in a dangerous felony, such as robbery, burglary, or rape,
guilty of murder when death is caused during the commission of the
felony. 73 There are various limitations on the rule, 74 but these do not
detract from its strict liability character. 75 The getaway driver, with
no intent to kill, and even without awareness of any such intention on
the part of his accomplices, is deemed guilty of murder when an
accomplice kills (or, for that matter, is killed) inside the bank or the
store. The rule remains an established part of positive law despite
sustained and cogent criticism. 76 Indeed, the modern scholarship
seems less interested in whether the rule should pass away than in
why it hasn't.
77
Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616
(2002). The attempt/success distinction seems like a strong candidate for attributing legislative
choice to cognitive predisposition because the public choice incentives point in the other
direction. Felony murder might be the product of law-and-order politics pure and simple, but the
attempt/success distinction is not so easily explained.
72. Moore recognizes that there is some tension between his powerful critique of all prior
defenses of the harm doctrine and his willingness to use the doctrine's hitherto unjustified
acceptance as itself a justification. Moore, supra note 69, at 266-67. Coupled with his preferred
method of justification, his critique of prior justifications offered for the harm-doctrine fits quite
nicely with the thesis that the harm doctrine rests less on widely shared moral intuitions and
more on widely shared cognitive tendencies.
73. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 7.5, at 671-76.
74. Id. at 672-81.
75. Some commentators distinguish between a strict liability interpretation of the rule and
an interpretation premised on substitute culpability or constructive malice. See, e.g., Nelson E.
Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Cross-roads, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 446, 453-60 (1985) (explaining this distinction). An intent to rob, however, is
neither the intent to kill nor, ipse facto, depraved indifference to human life. The effect of the
rule, however worded in a given statute or jury instruction, is to hold the felons strictly liable as
murderers when death results. See Note, Felony-Murder: A Tort Law Reconceptualization, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1918, 1918 (1986) ("A comparison with the principles of tort law will show that
felony murder defendants receive considerably less protection from the law than defendants in
wrongful death actions.").
76. Denying the attractiveness of the intent-based retributivists' challenge to the special
rules governing killings during crime is no easy task. But even conceding the power of those
arguments, they are indisputably being ignored. Courts and legislatures seem committed to this
form of strict liability in criminal law. Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a
Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 77 (1990).
77. Roth & Sundby, supra note 75, at 448 ("The felony-murder rule's continued vitality
despite articulate criticisms of both its rationale and its results indicate [sic] that a policy
analysis alone will not abate its use") (proposing constitutional attacks that likewise have not
succeeded); James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the
Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1431 (1994) ("My goal is
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Part of the explanation for the survival of the felony murder
rule is political. The rule helps prosecutors, who have great influence
with legislators, and hurts felons, who have little.78 The rule reduces
the prosecution's burden of proof and encourages confessions from
suspects foolish enough to believe that only the person who did the
killing is liable for the murder.
FAE may also play a significant role in the rule's survival.
Legislators and judges may very well focus on behavior, rather than
situation, and therefore attribute death to the non-shooting
accomplices rather than to the unexpected resistance of the victim,
intervention of the police, accidental discharge of a weapon, or
collision during a chase. Alternatively, they may reasonably believe
that the electorate will make a similar judgment. 79
The criminal law scholars have asked: "How is the felony-
murder defendant different from any other robbery defendant?" The
rational answer is that, absent some mens rea with respect to the
killing, as distinct from the robbery, there is no difference. But FAE
inclines the observer against the rational conclusion. The difference is
more modest: to understand how a rule of law that has been maligned so mercilessly for so long
and that is putatively irreconcilable with basic premises of modern criminal jurisprudence has
survived and promises to persist into the twenty-first century." (footnote omitted)).
78. See Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony-Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31
ARiz. ST. L.J. 763, 767 (1999) ("Notwithstanding trenchant criticism, the rule still operates
throughout the United States because lawmakers lack the courage to amend or repeal it.");
Tomkovicz, supra note 77, at 1460-65 (explaining power of law-and-order politics and heightened
popular concern when human life is lost).
79. See Tomkovicz, supra note 77, at 1477.
These strains of popular thought concerning culpability are intertwined and
inseparable. The reason for exploring them here is not to suggest that the
public finds scholarly conceptions of fault, blame, and criminal punishment
generally unacceptable as the basis for a system of criminal laws. The law on
the whole incorporates and is consistent with the culpability principles
predominant in scholarly thought. The point is that there are additional
premises that are integral parts of the public psychology. Those premises help
account for the contemporary retention of a doctrine descended from prior
generations and compatible with modern American politics. They help explain
the inefficacy of the scholarly community's accusations that felony-murder
transgresses basic principles and the failure of numerous efforts to overthrow
the rule.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The Darley & Robinson findings on felony murder suggest that the popular view may be
closer to the academic view than Professor Tomkovicz supposed. Compare id., with supra note
29. The Darley & Robinson subjects would only have imposed strict liability for manslaughter in
the felony murder context. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 29, at 178. Even this, however, is a
clear departure from the culpability principle. Professor Tomkovicz took a somewhat agnostic
view about the ultimate merits of the popular as opposed to the academic view. My point here is
that research on FAE gives us some reason to regard opinion supporting the felony murder rule,
whether popular or professional, as determined more by cognitive predisposition than by any
plausible moral judgment.
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that the felony murder defendant's robbery resulted in death, and it
follows that the person, not the situation, must be to blame for it.
One key to any plausible defense of grading criminal liability
according to harm caused is a strong proximate cause limit.80 Absent
such a limit, the lottery-like character of strict liability doctrines such
as felony murder becomes more pronounced. FAE, together with the
hindsight bias, however, suggests that proximate cause-notoriously
difficult to define more precisely than as an appeal to intuition-will
tend to be applied expansively rather than restrictively. The modern
felony murder case law, for instance, includes appellate opinions
upholding convictions on rather improbable causal sequences.
Courts have upheld felony murder convictions predicated on
aggravated possession of a stolen vehicle, when, following a high-
speed chase, the defendant abandoned the stolen car on foot, and was
then pursued on foot by an officer who was run down by the vehicle of
another;81 predicated on complicity in a burglary when the principal's
entry precipitated a heart attack by a resident;8 2 and predicated on
rape and assault when the elderly victim became depressed, lost
appetite, and choked to death during assisted feeding in a nursing
home a month after the attack.83 These decisions necessarily follow
trial verdicts favorable to the government, revealing that juries as
well as judges agreed with the attribution of responsibility to the
accused.8 4 Reliance on proximate cause to limit harm-based liability
would appear, in practice, to be misplaced.
80. See Alexander, supra note 69, at 13-17 (arguing that proximate cause reduces to a
culpability-based limit on harm-caused liability, and that without such a limit, harm-caused
liability would be too unfair even for its proponents).
81. People v. McCarty, 769 N.E.2d 985 (Ill. App. 2002), vacated, 785 N.E.2d 859 (Ill. 2003),
directed to reconsider in light of People v. Balk, 784 N.E.2d 825 (Ill. 2003).
82. People v. Howard, 661 N.Y.S.2d 386, 386-88 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that the
government needed only to prove participation in the burglary and the cause of death to
establish felony murder liability).
83. Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78 (7th Cir. 1993).
84. Professor Finkel's study of mock jurors given felony murder scenarios suggests
substantial willingness to nullify the felony murder rule. See FINKEL, supra note 3, at 164-69.
The study design, however, gave each juror four defendants to judge, one the triggerman and the
others accomplices. "Thus, although the subjects judged the triggerman harshly, they did not
transfer their judgments to the accessories." Id. at 166. Given the scenario, the subjects could
excuse the accomplices while still insisting on personal as opposed to situational causation. Cf.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 139-41 (1987) (upholding capital sentences for felony murder
convictions arising out of prison escape). In Tison, the father of the defendants had died of
exposure in the desert following a shootout with police. Id. at 141. With the chief culprit removed
from the scene, the search for personal rather than situational causes would turn to his
surviving sons, even though neither had actually shot the victims. Id. In any event, Professor
Finkel may be overstating the degree of community hostility to the felony murder doctrine.
There is no pressure to abolish it and the reported cases include too many convictions to believe
that widespread nullification is taking place.
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A final doctrinal anomaly involving harm actually caused is the
so-called Pinkerton doctrine. The Supreme Court has held that
members of a criminal conspiracy are ipse facto liable as accomplices
for the substantive offenses committed by coconspirators in
furtherance of the conspiracy, so long as these substantive crimes
were not unforeseeable.8 5 The peculiar feature of the doctrine is that
the defendant remains liable as an accomplice even after he has been
arrested and jailed.8 6 One can imagine hypotheticals in which this
result makes sense, such as when the defendant hires a contract
killer, is then arrested, and the killer follows through on the plot. In
the ordinary Pinkerton case, however, liability attaches to crimes that
were merely foreseeable, rather than actually foreseen, by the
accused. This broad view of human agency is more consistent with
FAE than with any rational justification. Reflecting the need to hold
someone responsible for negative outcomes, the law attributes
responsibility to the person it has in custody, rather than to those
whose independent actions are the dominant causes of the new
offenses.
IV. EXPLAINING THE DEFENSES
A. Personal and Impersonal External Causes: Insanity, Necessity, and
Intoxication Contrasted With Duress, and the Abuse Excuse
The criminal law sometimes excuses the intentional or reckless
causing of harm. Insanity,87 necessity,"" and duress8 9 are well-known
examples. The plea of duress or insanity admits that the defendant
intended to and did cause harm. Responsibility for the defendant's
conduct, however, lies outside his moral agency, with an identifiable
85. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946).
86. Id. The Pinkerton doctrine's recent use in litigation has been to impose on conspirators
the enhanced penalties provided by Congress for the use of firearms during crimes, so that any
conspirator, even one not present at the time of the substantive offense, is held guilty of carrying
and using a firearm during the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1098-99
(11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bailey, 235 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 2000).
87. See LAFAVE, supra note 9, §§ 4.1-4.7, at 321-91 (discussing insanity defense); 2 PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173, at 280-313 (1984) (same).
88. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 5.4, at 476-86 (discussing necessity defense); 2
ROBINSON, supra note 87, § 124, at 45-68 (same).
89. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 5.3, at 467-76; 2 ROBINSON, supra note 87, § 177, at
347-72.
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disease9° or a third party's threat. 91 From a retributive point of view,
however, the scope of these defenses is not consistently defined.
The different legal treatment of duress and necessity is
illuminated by FAE. Duress requires an immediate threat, one that
would overcome the resistance of an ordinary person, even if the
defendant is not an ordinary person. A defense of duress is generally
not available to counter a charge of murder.92 The general choice-of-
evils defense, which was not generally recognized by the common law
courts, 93 is not universally recognized by American legislators, 94 and is
grudgingly interpreted by the courts. 95 Duress, with its focus on the
blameworthy threats of a third party,96 has roots in the common law
97
and is pervasively recognized in contemporary positive law.98 The
more sympathetic treatment of duress may reflect a greater
90. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 100 (1987) ("Seen in this way it
is apparent why the excuse of legal insanity is fundamental. No blaming system would be
coherent if it imposed blame without regard to moral agency. We may become angry with an
object or an animal that thwarts us, but we can't blame it.").
91. The duress defense was once viewed as a justification based on choosing the lesser of
two evils. See LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 5.3, at 473. The modern view is that "[tihe excusing
condition in duress is the impairment of the actor's ability to control his conduct." 2 ROBINSON,
supra note 87, § 177(b), at 351. The Model Penal Code makes the defense available when the
defendant was faced with a threat of force "that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation
would have been unable to resist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
92. See KADISH, supra note 90, at 93-94.
Here too there is an apparent gap between excuses allowed by the law and the
requirements of just blaming. ... The common law and the law of most states
excuse in only one situation of this kind-duress ... and even then, under the
common law and the law of most jurisdictions, the act is excused only when
the threat is immediate and the crime in not a homicidal one.
Id. at 93. (footnote omitted).
93. Regina v. Dudley, 14 Q.B. 273 (1884) (rejecting necessity defense to murder charge
arising from killing of human being for food by starving castaways). Early English authorities
referred to necessity but probably comprehended self-defense under this rubric. See JEROME
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 416-17 (2d ed. 1947).
94. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 87, § 124(a), at 45 ("The lesser evils defense, sometimes
called 'choice of evils' or 'necessity' or the general justification defense, is recognized in about one-
half of American jurisdictions." (footnote omitted)).
95. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 489-95 (2001)
(concluding that legislature implicitly excluded necessity defense when adopting Controlled
Substances Act); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-17 (1980) (recognizing necessity
defense to charge of escape, but refusing to permit jury to consider either duress or necessity
without showing that escape was only means possible of avoiding greater evils and that the
accused promptly return to custody).
96. KADISH, supra note 90, at 93 (referring to excuses "based on reasonable deficiency of
will" (footnote omitted)).
97. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *30.
98. 2 ROBINSON, supra note 87, § 177(a), at 348 ("Nearly every American jurisdiction
recognizes some form of duress excuse." (footnote omitted)).
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willingness to attribute negative outcomes to human beings rather
than to impersonal factors.
Even in the days when many jurisdictions accepted the ALI's
definition of the insanity defense, by recognizing a volitional as well as
a cognitive prong to the excuse, 99 the accused could not claim either
prong without first establishing a recognized medical disease or
defect. 100 Whatever the effect on behavior or cognition, clinically
recognized "disorders" do not by themselves support an insanity
plea.' 01 The contemporary return to the M'Naghten test holds
accountable even a defendant who acted in response to an irresistible
impulse caused by a recognized species of mental illness.'
0 2
The Hinckley case and its aftermath provide an excellent
example of person/situation attributions in the criminal justice
system.103 At the trial, the jurors found Hinckley not guilty by reason
of insanity-a verdict FAE predicts jurors would be reluctant to reach.
The defense, however, had a strong case; leaving the psychiatric
technicalities to one side, Hinckley seemed to fit the popular
understanding of crazy. 10 4 As for behavioral control, Hinckley pulled
the trigger with the proverbial policeman at his elbow.1
05
99. See Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of the conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." (brackets in original)).
100. Id. at 98 ("The modern tests of legal insanity are varied and controversial, but they all
rest on the view that the claim of incapacity to comply with the law-because of defects of
understanding or self-control-is an excuse only if it is the result of a mental disease." (footnote
omitted)). The definition of "mental disease or defect" has been fraught with uncertainty. See
LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 4.3(c), at 347-48; 2 ROBINSON, supra note 87, § 173(b), at 286-90.
101. Cf. P. Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 34 SOC. PSYCHIATRY
& PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 231, 234 (1999) ("Over the past decade, however, there have been
a number of well-conducted surveys .... These studies show that antisocial personality disorder
is extremely common in prisons with prevalence rates as high as 40-60% among the male
sentenced population.").
102. The M'Naghten test in pristine form excludes any consideration of behavioral control.
See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 4.2, at 340 ("After MNaghten, English trial judges instructed
juries only in terms of the right-wrong test and 'irresistible impulse' was expressly rejected as 'a
most dangerous doctrine' in 1863." (footnote omitted)).
103. For the evidence and the verdict, see generally LOW ET AL., supra note 2.
104. The basic irrationality of assassinating the President to win the love of a movie star is
widely recognized. As defense counsel put it in closing argument:
In his own mind, defendant had two compelling reasons to do what he did. To
terminate his own existence and to accomplish his ideal union with Jodie
Foster, whether it be in this world or the next . . . [In] a classic
understatement, Dr. Dietz stated that these were not the reasonable acts of a
completely rational individual.
LOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 103 (ellipsis in original) (citing closing argument of defense counsel
Vincent Fuller). A survey conducted shortly after the trial found that 73.3% of respondents
thought that Hinckley was guilty, but that only 65.7% thought he was insane. 59.5% thought he
1408
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The decision, however, provoked a political reaction that
sharply curtailed the insanity defense in both the federal system
10 6
and most of the states. 10 7 Legislators, following popular opinion,
viewed the acquittal as a miscarriage of justice.108 Only by attributing
behavior to the individual, or construing mental illness as personal
rather than situational, can this conclusion make any sense. 109 While
social control interests are at stake in criminal justice, they play only
a decidedly minor role in the insanity context, where acquittal leads to
civil commitment"0 (where Hinckley remains to this day)."' The risks
should be both punished and treated psychiatrically, while 14.1% said he should be treated but
not punished. The respondents, however, appeared not to understand either the legal definition
of insanity or to realize that Hinckley's commitment would be indefinite. Valerie P. Hans & Dan
Slater, John Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The Public's Verdict, 47 PUB. OP. Q. 202, 206
(1982). The numbers are consistent with FAE; about ten percent of the respondents would hold
Hinckley responsible even though they characterized him as insane, and a majority of 59.6%
would hold him responsible even though he needed psychiatric therapy.
105. See LOW ET AL., supra note 2, at 84 ("When you look at the videotape you see a Secret
Service agent walks right up to Mr. Hinckley and turns to the left and it is at that point after the
agent turns his back away that Mr. Hinckley pulls out the gun and fires." (citing closing
argument of government attorney Roger Adelman)).
106. See Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §17 (2000) (reinstating M'Naghten test).
107. Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 943, 960-61 (1999).
Enough states reverted to M'Naghten that it displaced the Code's formulation
as the states' majority rule, and Congress saw fit to dump the Model Penal
Code test for all federal prosecutions, substituting another version of
M'Naghten. But that was not all. The move to restrict the insanity defense
included procedural changes in many jurisdictions, such as shifting the burden
of proof of insanity to the defendant (a reform now adopted by most
jurisdictions), making it harder for insanity acquittees to obtain their release,
introducing a new "guilty but mentally ill" verdict, and even, in the case of a
few states, abolishing the defense entirely.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
108. See, e.g., GEORGE E. DIX & M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
855-59 (5th ed. 1996); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of
Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 609 (1990).
109. Kadish, supra note 107, at 960.
The main target of the attack was the volitional prong of the Model Penal
Code's formulation. Apparently it's easier to accept that a person's mental
impairment may disable him from knowing what he did than that it prevents
him from willing the criminal action he performed. The latter cuts too deeply
into how we corceive of human behavior.
Id.
110. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 4.1, at 323.
The insanity defense is quite different from other defenses in that the result, if
it is successfully interposed, is not acquittal and outright release of the
accused but rather a special form of verdict or finding ("not guilty by reason of
insanity") which is usually followed by commitment of the defendant to a
mental institution. Thus, its purpose is usually said to be that of separating
from the criminal justice system those who should only be subjected to a
medical-custodial disposition.
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that the civil system will restrain less effectively than the criminal
system, or the risk that potential criminals, planning to fake the
defense, would rather be committed than imprisoned, seem quite
remote. 112 The best explanation for the return to M'Naghten may very
well be FAE-public opinion and legislators following it attribute
crime to the person rather than the disease.
Strikingly, at the same time that the law has held the mentally
ill responsible for their behavior, it has also moved in the direction of
adopting sexual predator laws that authorize indefinite civil
commitment based on the propensity to commit future offenses.
113
Indeed, the Supreme Court now holds that mental abnormality
producing "serious difficulty in controlling behavior" permits
indefinite civil commitment. 114 If mental disorders are thought
powerful enough to predict future behavior with sufficient confidence
to commit the legally innocent to institutions as a preventive measure,




I 11. Cristy Gutowski, Why Lemak Has Long Odds With Rare Insanity Defense, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, Nov. 13, 2001, at 1 ("Some argue John Hinckley, found not guilty by reason of insanity
for his attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1981, might be out of prison today
had he been convicted. Instead, Hinckley remains confined to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in
Washington, D.C."), available at 2001 WL 30249936.
112. The Supreme Court has held that the civil commitment following an insanity acquittal
can exceed the maximum time that might have been imposed following a conviction. Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-69 (1983). Pleading the defense thus runs the risk of indefinite
detention. See also LaFave, supra note 9, § 4.6, at 390-91 (noting that "in most jurisdictions the
burden of proof is on the patient, in habeas corpus or other statutory proceedings for release, to
persuade the court that he meets the statutory criteria and is thus entitled to release."). While
the burden on the patient is particularly difficult when the hospital staff do not support his
request, even the support of the hospital professionals often does not persuade courts that doubt
the ability of those professionals to evaluate dangerousness. Id. at 391.
113. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1430 n.6 (2001) (At the time Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346 (1997), was argued, "six states had such [sexual predator commitment] statutes-the
other five [besides Kansas] being Arizona, California, Minnesota, Washington, and Wisconsin-
and thirty-eight states, including New Jersey and New York, filed amicus briefs successfully
urging the Justices to uphold the law.").
114. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
115. Professor Morse exposes the contradiction succinctly: "[an agent responsible enough to
warrant criminal punishment is sufficiently responsible to avoid preventive detention." Morse,
supra note 18, at 259. The justices of the Supreme Court are probably fully aware of the
inconsistency here; the Crane test of eligibility for commitment seems indistinguishable from the
ALI's insanity defense, but Justice Breyer was careful to say "serious difficulty controlling
behavior" rather than "lacks substantial capacity." Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
1410
2003] FUNDAMENTAL RETRIBUTION ERROR 1411
Many factors contribute to the political prevalence of this
anomaly. Bona fide social control interests, 16 magnified by law-and-
order politics, 11 7 certainly play their role. FAE, however, may very
well play a role as well. The distinction between narrow definitions of
the insanity defense and the willingness to confine based on
propensity bears a certain resemblance to the quiz master experiment.
Intellectually, legislators and voters know that criminal behavior is
powerfully induced, and they show that awareness by adopting sexual
predator laws. At another level, however, they cannot get over
attributing to the defendant responsibility for the very acts the sexual
predator laws suppose to be beyond his control.
The so-called "abuse excuse," the plea that a homicide victim's
mistreatment of the defendant excuses (or even justifies) the homicide,
is not a single defense but a ganglia of doctrinal innovations. The most
important of these doctrines broaden the grounds of self-defense by
relaxing the imminence requirement,118  and admitting social
framework evidence in the form of expert opinions (syndrome
116. "Both [James Allen Egelhoff and Leroy Hendricks] committed devilish deeds and both
appear to be very dangerous people. Few people will shed a tear for them if the Court's decisions
weigh public safety more heavily than culpability." Morse, supra note 18, at 253.
117. See David J. Gottlieb, Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1031,
1047-48 (2002).
Like the Washington SVP Act, which Kansas adopted practically verbatim, the
Kansas SVP Act was the product of intense public outcry after the commission
of a terrible crime by a former prisoner who had been released from his
criminal sentence. In each state, task forces were formed, with the purpose of
designing more severe sentences for individuals accused of sexual offenses. In
Kansas, the primary expression of this concern was a toughening of criminal
penalties. Thus, the State added to its determinate sentencing law an
enhancement for individuals designated as sexually violent predators,
increased sentences for violent offenders, and enacted a death penalty bill.
But the task force struggled with the question of how to continue confinement
of individuals who were entitled by law to their freedom at the end of their
sentence. The task force wished to increase the sentence of these individuals
but was unable to do so by criminal sanction because of the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws and double jeopardy. The task force
therefore turned to possible civil remedies. The outcome of this concern was
the SVP Act, a statute which promised the continued confinement of
"dangerous sex offenders... past their scheduled prison sentence." Although
confinement under the Act was designated as civil, it was troubling that its
confinement was, in essence, limited to those already convicted of sex offenses.
It was also troubling that the "civil" treatment did not commence until the
conclusion of the inmate's criminal sentence.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
118. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1574, 1582 (1993) (noting that even jurisdictions with an imminence standard will
sometimes consider the known violence of an assailant or testimony regarding the battered
woman syndrome).
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evidence). 119 Tactically, the defense aims to cast blame on the
deceased, without invoking the plea of involuntary manslaughter.
The "abuse excuse" has provoked heated debate. Distinguished
critics, including Alan Dershowitz and James Q. Wilson, argue that
the "abuse excuse" implicitly rejects, and thereby threatens more
generally, the criminal law's fundamental premise of free will.
120
What this criticism neglects is that expansive notions of excuse have
thrived only when the defendant can cast blame on another human
being. Paradoxically, the defendant can persuade judges, jurors and
legislators to blame the victim only on the assumption that the victim
had free will.
When the defendant points to situational factors other than
wrongdoing by another human being, the law's understanding turns
into condemnation. Intoxication, even when convincingly
characterized as a disease, is not recognized as an excuse, even to such
petty offenses as public drunkenness. 12' Just as the law condemns the
completed offense more severely than its fortuitous failure, so the law
equates the choice to get drunk (even when that choice was induced by
pathology) with the choice to kill, rape, or rob. 22 Only this sort of
moral equation can justify treating one who kills because intoxicated
with one who kills because greedy or sadistic. Yet drunkenness, by
119. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 7.22, at 983
(2d ed. 1999) ("Many cases approve evidence of battered woman syndrome offered to support
claims of self-defense where it sheds some light on defendant's subjective fear and its nature and
reasonableness."). Professor Mosteller has persuasively traced the receptivity to social
framework evidence to a political determination that the balance of advantage should be shifted
in certain categories of cases. See Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal
Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 478-91 (1996). If that is so, then it is substantially
accurate to treat the reception of social framework evidence as an indirect way of modifying the
substantive criminal law.
120. See generally DERSHOWITZ, supra note 16; JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT (1997).
121. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 87, § 176, at 337-38 (leaving aside situations in which
intoxication may be inconsistent with an element of the charged crime, a few jurisdictions
provide no defense of intoxication, most provide a defense limited to involuntary intoxication,
and a few permit intoxication that has the same cognitive or behavioral effects as required to
show legal insanity). The use of intoxication to negative an element of the charge is limited by a
variety of doctrines. See 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL DEFENSES § 65(a), at 292-93 (1984). In
some places intoxication can negative specific but not general intent; in others it can negative
intent but not recklessness; still others forbid consideration of intoxication altogether even when
intoxication is alleged to be inconsistent with specific intent. Id. The Supreme Court upheld this
practice in Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 41-43 (1996).
122. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 87, § 162(b), at 250 (1984) ("[Tlhe imputation of
recklessness is objectionable because even if the actor is reckless, or even purposeful, as to
getting intoxicated, it does not follow that he is in fact reckless as to causing the death of a
pedestrian. The notion that a person risks all manner of resulting harm when he voluntarily
becomes intoxicated is common, but it is obviously not necessarily correct." (footnote omitted)).
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itself, is not a crime, a fact that comports at best uneasily with any
moral equation of drinking and killing.
The "abuse excuse," then, does not reflect any lack of respect
for the law's assumption of free will. Rather, the refraction of the free
will postulate through cognitive processes that exaggerate, rather
than trivialize, personal responsibility goes a long way toward
explaining the success of the "abuse excuse" relative to the success of
claims founded on situational, but nonhuman causative factors. A
rational assessment of blameworthiness might very well approve of
the "abuse excuse." It is hard to imagine, however, any rational
assessment of blameworthiness that approved of the "abuse excuse"
that would not also require legal excuses for intoxication and necessity
far broader than those available under current law.
B. Causing the Condition of One's Own Defense: Forfeiture Contrasted
With Culpability Analysis
Frequently, the defendant asserting either excuse or
justification may have brought himself into the situation in which he
was pressured into harmful conduct. Generally speaking, current law
holds this against the accused, typically by prohibiting the defendant
from raising the defense at all if he was at fault, even if only to the
degree of negligence, in creating the excusing or justifying condition.1
23
Some jurisdictions go further and do not require any fault with
regards to creating the condition at all when the accused could have
avoided the excusing situation. 124
As Professor Robinson has argued, the logical approach from
the standpoint of the culpability principle would be to grade the actor's
liability according to the degree of fault shown in the creation of the
excusing condition. 125 Thus, one who negligently commences an affray
or exposes himself to the risk of duress might be guilty of a crime of
negligence, but not of an intentional or reckless one. The law,
however, appears to follow the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing model at least
as often as it follows culpability analysis.
FAE may have something to do with the forfeiture model's
popularity. Judges and legislators may be attributing the ultimate
harm to the actor's original choice and ignoring situational variables
that develop downstream. For purposes of illustration, consider the
case of an attempted murder or aggravated assault defendant who
123. See Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the
Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 8-14 (1985).
124. See id. at 2-8.
125. See id. at 27.
2003] 1413
1414 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 56:1383
started the fight with non-deadly force, and whose adversary raises
the ante by drawing a knife. The defendant draws a gun and wounds
the victim. Under the forfeiture model, the defendant may not raise
self-defense at all. Yet had the deceased prevailed in the struggle, he
too would be guilty of attempted murder or aggravated assault, for the
escalation from reasonable to deadly force would forfeit his self-
defense claim. In the eyes of the law, whoever survives bears the
blame more properly apportioned between the combatants.
C. Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Cases
One final topic merits discussion under the general rubric of
the excuses. Generally, the Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence holds that murderers may be executed so long as the
sentencing tribunal has discretion to withhold the death penalty and
so long as that discretion is guided by an individualized assessment of
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each case. 126 Given
that discretion to show mercy is also discretion to show none, there is
considerable tension between the capital defendant's right to
discretionary mercy and his right to have sentencing discretion
exercised within the constraints of aggravating and mitigating factors
set by statute or court decision. 127 FAE, however, suggests a perhaps
more intractable problem with the Court's project of guiding discretion
in capital cases.
FAE implies that capital sentencers will tend to underestimate
situational factors that might mitigate a particular murder.1 28 For
126. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that a sentencer in capital cases
must be allowed to consider mitigating factors offered by the defense even though factor is not
recognized in applicable, facially valid statute); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding
constitutionality of guided discretion death penalty statute); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating statute that made death penalty mandatory in defined categories of
cases).
127. E.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 382 (1995)
("This dilemma between Gregg's seeming insistence on channeling and Woodson's seeming
insistence on uncircumscribed consideration of mitigating evidence constitutes the central
dilemma in post-Furman capital punishment law.").
128. See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1459 (1997).
Intensifying the effect of this perceived disparity in ability and the actual
disparity in resources is the fact that the prosecution's implicit and
overarching "theory" of the typical capital case generally comports with the
jurors' stereotypical beliefs about crime and punishment. The notion that a
defendant's crime stems entirely from his evil makeup and that he therefore
deserves to be judged and punished exclusively on the basis of his presumably
free, morally blameworthy choices is rooted in a longstanding cultural ethos
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instance, Robert Alton Harris committed a horrific double murder, but
only after a lifetime of brutalization and abuse that most of us simply
cannot conceive. 129 The jury, in effect, attributed the crime to
personality rather than situation. So too with the juries who have
sentenced mentally retarded 130 or extremely youthful 3 defendants to
death for murders that do not seem any more evil than murder always
is.
The Court's basic aim in the death penalty cases seems to have
become forcing the states to sift the population of convicted murderers
and reserve the death penalty for the worst of the worst. A rational
approach to this goal would be to limit the absolute number of death
sentences any jurisdiction could impose, and leave it to the political
authorities to prioritize by identifying those murderers who have
earned the community's most intense condemnation. Such an
approach would force decision makers to consider impersonal
mitigating circumstances because the personal element is present in
every case. Leaving the decision to juries in individual cases would be
an odd way to pursue comparative reprehensibility determinations,
even if juries rationally assessed the weight of extenuating situational
factors. FAE implies that juries are not likely to make any such fully
rational assessment. Whether one agrees with Justice Blackmun, who
that capital jurors (like most citizens) have been conditioned to accept
uncritically. Add to this the well-documented tendency of most people to
commit what psychologists have termed the "fundamental attribution error"-
providing causal explanations for the behavior of others in largely
dispositional or personal as opposed to situational or contextual terms. As a
result, the typical juror's preexisting framework for understanding behavior is
highly compatible with the basic terms of the typical prosecutorial narrative.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
129. David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1648-49 (1993).
What, for example, of the formative experiences of Robert Alton Harris, who
murdered two San Diego teenagers in 1978 when he stole their car for use in a
bank robbery, and finished their fast food hamburgers about fifteen minutes
after the killings? Harris was the son of alcoholic parents, born prematurely
after his drunken father kicked the pregnant Mrs. Harris in a jealous frenzy.
This father, twice convicted of sexually molesting his daughters, beat his
children frequently; Harris's mother-also an alcoholic and arrested several
times-resented and abused him; he had a learning disability and a speech
problem and, according to evidence adduced after his trial and death sentence,
possible brain damage from fetal alcohol syndrome.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
130. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding execution of mentally-
retarded offender unconstitutional). Atkins has put a stop to the practice, but twelve states
executed thirty-five allegedly mentally retarded offenders during the period 1984-2000. Id. at
346-47 (citation omitted).
131. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding death sentences of
offenders who were, respectively, sixteen and seventeen at the time of the murders).
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thought that the failure of the guided discretion regime called for
abolition of the death penalty, 132 or with Justice Scalia, who thinks
that the failure of the regime calls for a return to the days of unguided




A review of doctrinal anomalies suggests that FAE operates
throughout the criminal justice system. Before any given defendant
can be punished, legislators must authorize the penalty, and judges
and juries must agree to impose it. The opportunity to reduce the
influence of cognitive predispositions is coextensively pervasive.
1. Reconsidering the Significance of Resulting Harm
At the legislative level, three general directions deserve to be
explored. First, the various doctrines that vary liability according to
fortuitous results should be reconsidered. Critics have long belabored
them, and no powerful defense has yet appeared. Their persistence is
powerful evidence of FAE's role in criminal justice. Indeed, so strong is
the attachment to these doctrines that I doubt that there is any
practical chance of reform. For whatever chance it might provide, the
harm doctrines should become widely understood as more consistent
with FAE than with any rational principle.
2. Distinguishing Situational, Third-Party, and Blame-the-Victim
Defenses
Second, with respect to the excuses, legislators (and judges to
the extent the judges are called upon to determine the scope of
substantive defenses 34) should distinguish situational excuses, third-
132. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1149 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari) (arguing that incompatible requirements of consistency across cases and fairness to
individuals called for abolition of capital punishment).
133. Id. at 1141-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (arguing that incompatible
requirements of limited discretion and plenary consideration of mitigation called for end to
guided-discretion regime).
134. In federal cases, the courts define affirmative defenses, subject to modification by
Congress. The underlying theory is that although Congress has not adopted definitions of most
defenses, Congress could not have intended liability in genuine cases of self-defense, entrapment,
or whatnot. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 447-49 (1932). Thus Congress,
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party excuses, and blame-the-victim excuses. Insanity, intoxication,
and necessity qualify as situational, because in these cases there is no
human agent to whom responsibility can be assigned. Duress and
entrapment fall into the second category; a human agent is blamed by
the defense, but that agent is not the victim of the defendant's
wrongdoing. When the defense attributes the crime to abuse inflicted
on the accused by someone other than the victim of the charged
offense, a similar classification is in order. Provocation in homicide
cases, some claims of consent in rape cases, and the most common
variations of the "abuse excuse" fall into the third category.
This classification does not have any rigorous doctrinal
implications. There is plenty of perfectly rational normative
disagreement about the exculpatory significance of the defendant's
excuse in each instance. What should be recognized is that the
willingness of observers to accept the defendant's claim will be
weakest in situational cases and strongest in blame-the-victim cases.
In particular, legislators should be more cautious of unjustified jury
acquittals in cases with blame-the-victim defenses than in those with
situational or third-party excuses. More specifically, the circumstances
justifying an instruction on voluntary manslaughter and self-defense
in homicide cases should be defined in light of the risk that jurors will
attribute an exaggerated degree of causal responsibility to the
deceased.
3. Rules Versus Standards
The third and final direction for legislative reforms is to regard
with skepticism legal standards that appeal to intuitive notions of
justice. Again, no specific doctrinal reform automatically follows. The
"reasonable person" sets the standard for so many of the excuses
because able lawyers simply could not articulate categorical rules that
accurately captured the moral content of the excuse. The drafters of
the Model Penal Code resorted to that formulation in many places. 13 5
through initial silence and subsequent acquiescence, delegated the definition of defenses to the
federal courts, subject to legislative modification of the sort that followed the Hinckley case. See
supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (entrapment
defense available when government agents employ "methods of persuasion or inducement which
create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who
are ready to commit it"); § 2.09(1) (duress defense available when defendant acts because
threatened with unlawful force against himself or another "that a person of reasonable firmness
in his situation would have been unable to resist"); § 2.02(d) (actor is negligent when he
disregards a risk "of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it ... involves a




They also defined proximate cause in terms of events so improbable
that punishment of the defendant for the result would simply be
unjust.136 Such formulations invite the fundamental attribution error,
but it by no means follows that rigid categories would on the whole be
any better.
Experience with the provocation defense is illustrative of the
difficulties with both rigid limits on defenses and broad standards
open to jury discretion. The common law defense's limited frame of
time and cognizable provocations are largely arbitrary.' 37 Under the
more general and more normative rubric of the MPC, however, juries
have been invited to blame the victim for her own death on account of
such affronts as threatening or attempting to leave a dysfunctional
relationship. 138 In choosing between rules and standards, legislatures
defining crimes should account for the risk that standards will be
applied by observers subject to FAE.
When more than one hallmark of the risk of cognitive error is
in play, legislatures should be most skeptical. For example, legislators
should be quite suspicious about relying on standards rather than
rules to govern excuses of the blame-the-victim variety, as both the
type of excuse and the amount of discretion given to juries in such a
situation increase the influence of FAE. In an odd rearrangement of
familiar political positions in homicide cases, this approach would cast
doubt on both the provocation defense and on relaxing the imminent
threat and duty-to-retreat rules in self-defense cases.
4. The Trial Level
At the trial level, judges and lawyers should understand FAE
and account for it in their choices. Again, however, there do not seem
to be any simple procedural reforms with a great deal of promise. In
the first place, much of FAE's influence operates at the legislative
stage. So long as statutes and appellate opinions set up norms
premised on exaggerated assessments of personal responsibility, the
trial process can do little if anything to temper such doctrines as
felony murder.
136. See § 2.03(2)(b) (conduct is legal cause of result when result is of same type as that
foreseen and "is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the
actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense" (brackets in original)).
137. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel & Jennifer L. Groscup, When Mistakes Happen:
Commonsense Rules of Culpability, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 65, 74-77 (1997).
138. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1339-42 (1997).
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The psychological literature includes some studies on debiasing
strategies-efforts to reduce or eliminate cognitive irrationalities-
that could possibly have applications in the context of FAE. Both
collective decision procedures 139 and accountability-the knowledge
that the decision will have to be defended in front of others140-have
shown some promise as debiasing strategies. There are good reasons,
however, to doubt that such debiasing strategies can succeed
completely.
Currently, juries are collective bodies, and jurors know now
that they will need to give reasons for their views during
deliberations. The empirical evidence on jury use of prior crimes
evidence nonetheless strongly suggests the persistent operation of
FAE.141 Similarly, legislatures are collective and deliberative bodies.
We have seen, however, that many legislative decisions are more
consonant with FAE than with rational policy judgments.
142
Direct attempts to deal with FAE in the courtroom have
serious drawbacks and limited potential effectiveness. Expert
139. See Dagmar Stahlberg et al., We Knew It All Along. Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63 ORG.
BEH. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 46, 48 (1995) ("[R]esearch has shown that these cognitive
biases [FAE, consensus underutilization, and base-rate fallacy] are attenuated in groups
compared to individual judgment conditions." (citations omitted)).
140. Phillip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental Attribution
Error, 48 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 227, 231 (1985) (noting that when observers knew they would need to
justify their attributions of essay-writers' attitudes, fundamental attribution error effect
disappeared).
141. See FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 61-62.
In criminal cases, evidence that the defendant has been convicted of other
crimes in the past is sometimes admitted for the limited purpose of
impeaching the defendant's credibility as a witness. The admission is
accompanied by an instruction that jurors not consider the prior convictions as
evidence of the defendant's guilt in the case at bar. Much experimental
research confirms that mock jurors are unable to adhere to this limiting
instruction. Those who sit on mock trials in which the priors are admitted
with the cautionary instruction convict at a higher rate than those who do not
learn about the priors. While not excluding other explanations, researchers
frequently speculate that the fundamental attribution error may account for
this effect: The priors lead jurors to conclude that the defendant is the sort of
guy who commits crimes like this.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
In some of this empirical research, the jurors deliberated in groups. See Valerie P. Hans &
Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated
Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 243 (1975-1976) (proof of prior conviction moved individual conviction
rate from 40% to 45%, but moved group deliberation conviction rate from 0 to 40%). Moreover,
the same phenomena was observed in the classic Kalven and Zeisel research, which was
conducted on actual juries in real cases. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 146-48 (1966) (conviction rate was 27% higher in cases in which jurors learned of
defendant's prior convictions).
142. See supra notes 66-122 and accompanying text.
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testimony to alert jurors to the effects of FAE would be expensive,
time consuming, and distracting. Given the reluctance of courts to
order compensation of experts for indigent defendants, 143 the expense
of expert testimony will cause it to leave behind many of the parties
who might need it most. Expert testimony, although helpful, also
apparently falls considerably short of guiding jurors to rational
assessments of the reliability of eyewitness identifications, seemingly
the closest analogy to the context of FAE. 144 Jury instructions (or pre-
instruction education)145 about cognitive tendencies might do no harm,
but given the dubious effects of instructions about the law, there
seems no reason to hope that they might do a great deal of good.
146
The empirical evidence regarding instructions about identification
evidence 47 and prior convictions 48 is not encouraging.
The burden of proof might be assigned as a counterweight. The
major role of the burden of proof, however, is with respect to the basic,
disputed historical facts. Shifting the burden with respect to facts,
because of doubts about the normative spin the jury may give those
facts, runs the risk that many good claims of excuse will be rejected.
Given the consensus that false positives are much worse than false
negatives in criminal cases, increasing the burden of proof for the
143. See David Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on Expert
Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 469, 486-87 (1992) ("Since lower
courts have interpreted Ake [v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)] to mean that the defense receives
assistance only when the accused's case will fail without it, the basic tools standard does very
little for most indigent defendants.").
144. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 213-24 (1995).
145. Professor Haney envisions some sort of pre-instruction education of jurors regarding
potential biases, prominently including FAE. See Craig Haney, Making Law Modern: Toward a
Contextual Model of Justice, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 30 (2002).
146. Professor Feigenson, for instance, doubts that jury instructions, even instructions
drafted more clearly than many current ones, would be an effective antidote to cognitive
tendencies. See Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think
About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 163 n.334
(concluding that standard reasonable-person negligence instruction invites FAE, and that
rewording instruction to focus on unreasonable risks rather than unreasonable persons might
help, but "given jurors' general inability to understand instructions such changes might not
significantly affect jurors' thinking"). For a review of studies casting doubt on jurors'
comprehension of instructions, see id. at 66 n.9.
147. See, e.g., Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy:
Assessing their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 817, 834 (1995) ("In summary,
the experiments reviewed above provide little evidence that judges' instructions concerning the
reliability of eyewitness identification improve juror decision making.").
148. See, e.g., Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror
Decision Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 76 (1995) ("Like many other researchers, we found
that limiting instructions had little effect on jurors' use of this evidence. Verdicts from mock
jurors with instructions about the restricted use of this information were not different from
verdicts of jurors without such instruction.").
1420 [Vol. 56:1383
FUNDAMENTAL RETRIBUTION ERROR
defense seems like a poor strategy for coping with cognitive
predispositions.
Good lawyers, of course, have grasped the basic tactical
implications of FAE without any need for the psychological literature.
The best defense is a good offense, as Alan Dershowitz shows in print
and as he and other able advocates have shown in practice.
149
Perhaps all that can be said from the standpoint of the interests of
justice is that the trial judge should recognize the psychological
dynamic at work, and, in borderline rulings on evidence and directed
verdicts, incline against the party inviting the jury to blame the
person rather than the situation.
B. Social Cognition and Theories of Punishment: Is There a
"Fundamental Retribution Error"?
For readers expecting an elegant policy response to the
influence of FAE in criminal justice, the preceding section may come
as a disappointment. It may also come with the ring of truth; human
cognition is what it is, and there are limits on what the law can do
about it.150 The persistence of the doctrines discussed in Parts II and
III affords some evidence of how durable FAE can be.
What if, as I suspect, FAE is largely irreducible? On that
assumption, FAE gives significant support to utilitarian, as opposed to
retributive or virtue-based, theories of punishment. 51 In particular,
FAE weighs heavily against mandatory retributivism, which would
seem likely in practice to impose punishment that the theory itself
forbids.
Retributive theory, which is probably the dominant model in
American legal thought,' 52 at least for the present, 153 regards
149. See generally ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE (1982).
150. Finkel, supra note 28, at 477.
The need to make attributions seems part and parcel of being human and
endemic to science. And if the fundamental attribution error hangs on
prototypical coattails, or is the tail that wags the dog, we best learn to
understand it and how to more effectively rein it in, for eliminating it entirely
seems out of the range of human capabilities.
Id.
151. For general surveys of the philosophy of punishment, see, for example, PHILIP BEAN,
PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL INQUIRY (1981); PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES]; NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA (1980).
152. See Dolinko, supra note 129, at 1623 ("It is widely acknowledged that retributivism,
once treated as an irrational vestige of benighted times, has enjoyed in recent years so vigorous a
revival that it can fairly be regarded today as the leading philosophical justification of the
institution of criminal punishment." (footnote omitted)).
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punishment inflicted for culpable wrongdoing as good of itself.
Probably the most famous expression of this approach is Kant's
dictum that even if a society were to disband the next day, its
members should still execute a convicted murderer.154 Modern
retributivists give different accounts of precisely why punishment of
culpable wrongdoing should be regarded as good of itself.155
Retributivists disagree about whether blameworthy conduct
affirmatively requires punishment or merely permits punishment if
the balance of other considerations so inclines. 156 Despite these
153. Retributivism's stock has risen and fallen over time. See id. at 1623 nn.1-2; David
Dolinko, The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1719, 1720 (1999) ("From our perspective
today, we can see that those seemingly antiquated retributive notions of which Hart spoke have
not only failed to disappear, but have come roaring back with-one might say-a vengeance.").
154. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals § 46(E), in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS
131, 156 (Hans Heiss ed., 2d ed. 1991).
Even if civil society were to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members
(for example, if a people who inhabited an island decided to separate and to
disperse to other parts of the world), the last murderer in prison would first
have to be executed in order that each should receive his deserts and that the
people should not bear the guilt of a capital crime through failing to insist on
its punishment; for if they do not do so, they can be regarded as accomplices in
the public violation of justice.
Id.
155. Kant and Hegel seem to have thought that respect for the offender's moral autonomy
requires retributive punishment. See G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, excerpt
reprinted as Punishment as Right, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 151, at 107
(retributive punishment "is regarded as containing the criminal's right and hence by being
punished he is honoured as a rational being'); Kant, supra note 154, at 154-55 ("Judicial
punishment can never be merely a means of furthering some extraneous good for the criminal
himself or for civil society, but must always be imposed on the criminal simply because he has
committed a crime. For a human being can never be manipulated just as a means of realising
someone else's intentions, and is not to be confused with the objects of the law of kind."). Other
theorists have justified retributive punishment on grounds of distributive justice, i.e., the
criminal has exploited the law-abiding by cheating on the law's system of reciprocal forbearance,
so that fair play requires punishment, regardless of consequences. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED 15 (1992) ("Retributive theorists claim that punishment makes
sure that wrongdoers suffer in proportion to their moral iniquity and thereby give up any unfair
advantage over others their wrongdoing may have won them." (footnote omitted)); Herbert
Morris, Persons and Punishment, reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 151, at
116, 116-17 ("[I]t is just to punish those who have violated the rules and caused the unfair
distribution of benefits and burdens. A person who violates the rules has something others
have-the benefits of the system-but by renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of
self-restraint, he has acquired an unfair advantage. Matters are not even until this advantage is
in some way erased.").
156. The view that culpable wrongdoing provides a necessary and sufficient reason for
punishment is referred to as "positive retributivism," "pure retributivism," or "mandatory
retributivism." The view that culpable wrongdoing authorizes, but does not require, punishment
is referred to as "permissive retributivism." Both views have distinguished defenders. Kant
appears to have taken the first view, although his discussion of the pardon power might be
thought to qualify his views on punishment as a categorical imperative. See Kant, supra note
154, at 157 (discussing mitigation of death sentences when capital wrongdoing is so widespread
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differences, all retributive theories share a family resemblance, rooted
in the reciprocal ideas that punishment can be deserved, and thus it
should never be undeserved.
Retributivism's main competitor is utilitarianism. The
utilitarian approach, with its own impressive lineage running back to
Beccaria 157 and Bentham, 158 regards punishment as an evil than can
be justified only by a favorable balance of future consequences. If
punishment prevents future crimes-by deterring others, 159 by
restraining the offender, 160 by setting a moral example, 16' or by
subjecting the offender to rehabilitation162-the suffering imposed on
the guilty might have benefits exceeding the costs.
Utilitarians regard retributivism as little more than glorified
revenge, and believe that characterizing the deliberate infliction of
pain as a good in itself is perverse. 63 Retributivists criticize
utilitarianism for reducing the offender to the status of a mere tool, a
thing to be made an example of for the benefit of society. 16 4 They also
note that utilitarianism logically permits punishment of the innocent,
cruel punishments, strict liability, and anything else that might
prevent future crime, however unfair or disproportionate such
that perfect justice might bring the state to "the stage of having no more subjects" or "blunt the
peoples' feelings by a spectacle of mass slaughter"). For more recent examples, see, for example,
MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997)
(defending mandatory retributivism); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS (1976) (defending permissive retributivism).
157. See generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764) (Henry Paolucci
trans., 1963) (influential early instrumental account of punishment, including defense of
proportionality and criticism of capital punishment).
158. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789) (seminal utilitarian account of punishment).
159. Deterrence plays a central role in economic analysis of criminal law. See, e.g., Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1193-95 (1985)
(arguing that criminal law's basic mission is to deter market bypassing behavior when tort
sanctions may be ineffective).
160. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 198-201 (1975) (advocating a focus
on incapacitation).
161. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence,
95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2479 (1997) (defending an expressive account of punishment, including
community policing, curfews, and alternative sanctions, designed to "deter as well as or better
than severe prison terms and ... cost much less").
162. Rehabilitation, once trendy, has fallen out of style as a justification for punishment. See
generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981).
163. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 234-35 (1968) ("To some critics
it appears to be a mysterious piece of moral alchemy in which the combination of the two evils of
moral wickedness and suffering are transmuted into good; to others the theory seems to be the
abandonment of any serious attempt to provide a moral justification for punishment.").
164. See, e.g., Kant, supra note 154.
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measures might be.165 Recent utilitarian rejoinders to these charges
suggest that the debate is far from settled. 166 Perhaps motivated by a
sense of the difficulties attending both the retributive and utilitarian
positions, some theorists have taken an Aristotelian turn toward
justifying punishment as a way of realizing virtue. 167 FAE poses an
important challenge to all three types of theories, although I aim to
show that the challenge is more serious for retributivists and virtue-
ethics theorists.
1. Fundamental Attribution Error and the Judgments Required by
Retributive Theory of Punishment
a. Types of Retributive Theories
Any retributive theory of punishment must give an account of
why deserved punishment is justified and how much punishment is
deserved in particular cases. 168 Culpability-based retributivists believe
that the actor's subjective awareness of wrongdoing triggers
blameworthiness and makes the actor eligible for punishment.
69
Harm-based retributivists believe that causing or risking harm
crosses the threshold of blameworthiness.
1 70
Whatever the trigger of blameworthiness may be, punishing
the blameworthy actor can be defended on various grounds. Some
theorists see punishment as the logical corollary of respect for the
offender's autonomy. 17' Others see punishment as fair play to the law-
abiding, correcting the distributive injustice worked by the actor's
165. See, e.g., BEAN, supra note 151, at 44 (summarizing these weaknesses of utilitarian
theories).
166. See generally Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and
Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115 (2000); Russell L. Christopher, Deterring
Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843 (2002).
167. See, e.g., Huigens, supra note 5.
168. H.L.A. Hart drew an influential distinction between the "general justifying aim" of
punishment from the distribution of punishment. See HART, supra note 163, at 8-13. Any
account of just punishment, whether consequentialist or deontological, must address both
questions.
169. On the distinction between culpability-based and intention-based retributivism, see
Cole, supra note 76, at 74-76.
170. This is probably the most common version of retributivism. Kant offers a leading
illustration. Given Kant's ethical system, which focuses on the will of the actor rather than the
consequences of the action, culpability is virtually built into the notion of retribution. Thus, Kant
insisted that only an "undeserved evil" called for retribution. Kant, supra note 154, at 155.
"Every transgression of the law can and must be explained only as the result of a maxim of the
criminal whereby he makes a rule out of misdeeds like the one in question." Id. at 145 note *.
171. See, e.g., HEGEL, supra note 155, at 107-08.
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cheating on society's system of reciprocal restraint. 172 Yet another
view is that retributive punishment is justified as a form of moral
rhetoric, designed to persuade the criminal to renounce his
wrongdoing and internalize the community's morality. 173 As to the
measure of punishment, retributivists (at least outside the capital
punishment context) appear to have abandoned the jus talonis in favor
of some intuitive proportionality assessment.
174
At least one additional important divide separates mandatory
retributivism from permissive retributivism. 175  To mandatory
retributivists, blameworthy behavior provides a necessary and
sufficient reason for punishment. To permissive retributivists,
blameworthy behavior only opens the moral door to punishment; its
actual infliction might be withheld for sufficiently strong
countervailing pragmatic reasons.
Within this schema there is widespread agreement that once
the moral threshold of blameworthiness is crossed, two further
conclusions are necessary before blame and punishment are justified.
The observer must conclude that the actor was responsible for his
behavior, in the sense that the result was not a faultless accident; i.e.,
the observer must believe that the actor had some culpable state of
mind. Finally, the observer must conclude that the actor has no
justification or excuse for the behavior.
176
172. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 155, at 116-18.
173. See R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20
CRIME & JUST. 1 (1996).
174. See, e.g., H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, reprinted in
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 151, at 119, 133-34.
175. See supra note 156.
176. See, e.g., KADISH, supra note 90, at 88; KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME
173 (1985) (arguing that the assignment of blame "presupposes a particular set of actions (those
that produce negative consequences), a specific level of personal causality (single causation at
the intentional level), a special combination of the dimensions of responsibility (causation,
knowledge of the consequences, intentionality, voluntary choice, and the capacity to distinguish
right from wrong), and the failure to have an adequate justification or excuse."); Thomas R.
Schultz & John M. Darley, An Information-Processing Model of Retributive Moral Judgments
Based on "Legal Reasoning," in 2 HANDBOOK OF MORAL BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT 247, 256
(William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz eds., 1991) ("Blame is a decision that a person is at
fault (given positive decisions on causation and responsibility)."). Kadish argues that
The three categories of legal excuses that I described in the previous section
suggest the common rationale behind excuses in both the law and everyday
moral judgments-namely, that justice requires the preclusion of blame where
none is deserved. In the first category, the person is not to blame because he
has no control over his movements; in the second, because though he breached
a legal norm, he acted in circumstances so constraining that most people
would have done the same; in the third, because though there is action in
breach of a norm in circumstances where most people would not have done the
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b. Blameworthiness and FAE
What all retributive theorists appear to share is a commitment
to avoid punishment in the absence of blameworthiness. What does
blameworthiness mean? The clearest approach to this question looks
to the excuses; even when the actor's behavior was intentional and
harmful, it may be excused on such grounds as insanity or duress.
177
Two basic approaches have emerged to define blameworthiness and
explain why excusing situations reduce or nullify it.178
The first approach looks to the actor's conduct as evidence of
his character. 179 If the actor caused harm in a situation in which a
good person would not have caused harm, the harm is attributable to
the actor's bad character. He may, on this character-based approach,
properly be blamed for the character defect that caused the harm. An
excuse, however, still can reduce or nullify the actor's
blameworthiness when he has some extreme incapacity to understand
or respect moral reasons for self-control.
180
The second approach looks to the actor's opportunity to choose
between causing harm and not causing it. These "choice theorists"
consider the actor to be blameworthy even if his choice is an aberrant
departure from his character. This seems plausible; the murder that
breaks an otherwise consistent pattern of virtuous behavior is still
blameworthy. If excuse is not to be reduced to justification, however, it
is necessary for some voluntary choices that cause unjustified harm to
be excused. The defendant acting under duress, for instance, acts
same, the person, because of a fundamental deficiency of mind, is not a
responsible moral agent.
KADISH, supra, at 88.
177. Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 28, 29 (1990)
("[T]he excuses are the royal road to theories of responsibility generally. The thought is that if
we understand why excuse in certain situations but not others, we will have gained a much more
general insight into the nature of responsibility itself.").
178. See, e.g., Rachael A. Hill, Comment, Character, Choice, and 'Aberrant Behavior"
Aligning Criminal Sentencing with Concepts of Moral Blame, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 975, 1017-22,
1072-88 (1998) (summarizing choice and character positions and defending character approach).
179. See generally Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of
Character to our Moral Culpability Judgments, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 59 (1990) (defending
character approach).
180. Whether blame may properly attach to unchosen character traits is a deep and
troubling question. See id. at 82-83. Even Professor Arenella, however, who would exclude from
blame moral psychopaths who lack the ability to conform to the law for moral (as opposed to
nonmoral) reasons, suggests that blame may be just so long as the actor has "some modest
capacity for critical self-reflection and self-revision." Id. at 82. The extremity of the cases he
finds troubling-the moral psychopath or the brainwashed accomplice-suggests that most




voluntarily and intentionally. The excuse is recognized not because
there was an inability to exercise behavioral control, but because the
choice presented was a hard one.181 What makes some choices harder
than others?
The most obvious answer is that the choice is hard, and an
excuse should be recognized, when the situational pressure is so
strong that many other persons would have responded by giving in to
the pressure and causing the unjustified harm. 8 2 The accused
behaved badly, but he was not deviant. Sometimes the law articulates
the point of reference in normative terms (the reasonable person, the
law-abiding person), and sometimes in statistically representative
terms (the ordinary person or the person of ordinary firmness). If this
focus on variance from a reasonable or ordinary person is what makes
hard choices excusable, however, the choice theorist is really blaming
the actor for his character. 8 3 Unlike the law's reasonable or ordinary
person, the actor chose to give in to the situational pressure. He is
blamed, in short, for having a different (and worse) character than
other persons.
FAE has troubling implications for the retributivist's project of
rationally assessing blameworthiness. The character-based approach
directly embraces the project of inferring personality traits from
behavior. This is the very inference that the psychological research
suggests human observers will make too readily. Consider, in this
regard, the Fidel Castro essays, the quiz master experiment, or the
181. See Moore, supra note 177, at 35 (defending excuse when the actor either lacked the
capacity or the "fair opportunity" to act justifiably). The use of the word "fair" here is a tip-off
that some normative idea of hard choices is being grafted on to the basic volitional account.
182. Professor Moore tries to avoid falling back on hypothetical reference persons to measure
hard choices by arguing that hard choices are those where the choice of evils is a close call from
an objective point of view. Id. at 40. There are at least two problems with this move. In the first
place, the law actually articulates the excuses in terms of hypothetical reference persons. In the
second place, to claim an excuse the actor must be motivated by the external pressure. An IRA
gunman may credibly threaten the accused with murder for refusing to drive a getaway car; but
if the accused is an IRA sympathizer who would be happy to help the gunmen even if
unthreatened, the excuse is unavailable. We withhold blame from the excused actor because he
is not deviant, not because he made a modest, as opposed to gross, arithmetic error.
183. See Hill, supra note 178, at 993.
Using a hypothetical reasonable person as a baseline introduces a concealed
character judgment into the choice-based approach. As with Moore's
"objectively regarded as evil" test, a reasonable person standard requires
courts to assess whether an actor's reaction to a perceived threat or affront
reveals a character trait that is undesirable according to society's standards.
When an actor behaves unreasonably, he expresses a bad character and is,
therefore, morally blameworthy. When an actor acts as a reasonable person
would, he does not reveal a bad character and is excused.
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foul shots taken in a dimly lit gymnasium.18 4 In these experiments,
observers held actors responsible despite the observers' knowledge of
very serious situational constraints. Indeed the term "correspondence
bias" refers precisely to the tendency to associate behavior with a
corresponding trait.
In the choice approach, the problem recurs. FAE predisposes
observers to exaggerate both volitional capacity and fair opportunity
to resist situational pressure. A choice theorist who does not repudiate
situational excuse altogether admits that some bad choices are not
blameworthy. As a result of FAE, however, in deciding how hard a
choice the actor faced, observers will tend to attribute the choice to the
actor's character rather than the situation.
FAE tends to magnify the causal significance of the defendant's
conduct relative to other factors. Observers predisposed to believe that
the world is just need to identify personal, rather than impersonal,
causes for negative events.18 5 Compounding this tendency is the so-
called hindsight bias, which inclines observers ex post to believe that
actual events were probable ex ante even when they were not.186 This,
in turn, inclines observers to infer intention, knowledge, or
recklessness from the foreseeability of events that were in fact not
foreseeable.
Harm-based retributivists, with their focus on causing or
risking harm, invite the tendency of observers to commingle fault with
causation, amplified by the hindsight bias. A purely subjectivist
culpability theorist, by contrast, considers the actor eligible for
punishment based on his subjective awareness of wrongdoing. This
may disadvantage the government unduly, as those who focus on the
person rather than the situation interpret failed attempts as innocent
accidents and harmless recklessness as due care.
As the utilitarians have pointed out, retributivists have some
difficulty in determining the amount of punishment required by any
given instance of culpable wrongdoing.187 To the extent that
retributivists rely on intuition or the sense of the community to
measure proportionate punishments, FAE suggests that officials
attempting to follow retributive theory will overpunish. Their
184. See supra notes 41-62 and accompanying text.
185. On the just-world hypothesis, see generally M. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD
(1980). On the implications of just-world beliefs for attributions of blame, see FEIGENSON, supra
note 3, at 100-101 (explaining how just-world thinking can lead to blaming the victim).
186. See, e.g., FEIGENSON, supra note 3, at 62-64.
187. See, e.g., BEAN, supra note 151, at 29 ("Retribution is unable to provide clear guidelines
as to what equivalence should mean in practice."). See generally Dolinko, supra note 129.
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intuitions will tend to overassess personal as opposed to situational
factors at the time of the wrongdoing.
This is especially likely for those retributivists who root the
justification of punishment in distributive justice. On that account,
the criminal deserves punishment for deviating from society's scheme
of mutual restraint. Yet if many people would have acted just as the
defendant did given the same situation, the defendant hasn't really
helped himself to any unfair advantage. If that really is why
punishment is deserved, retributivism in practice will dish out far
more punishment than fair play can justify.
All of these tendencies are of much greater concern for
mandatory retributivists than for their permissive counterparts. An
exaggerated sense of blame that only authorizes, but does not require,
punishment is little different in practice than a utilitarian theory
subject to (likewise exaggerated) culpability-based side-constraints.
But for the mandatory retributivist in the Kantian tradition, FAE is a
major challenge. The mandatory retributivist can hold his ground only
in the belief that legal procedures can counteract cognitive
predispositions. Yet, as we have seen, in many ways the legal system
has failed to counteract FAE. Nor is it entirely clear just what
procedures might do so. Given the high priority retributivists place on
not punishing the innocent, the failure of the legal system to
counteract cognitive predispositions is a strong point against
operating an actual criminal justice system according to mandatory
retributivism's prescriptions.
The debate over theories of punishment often seems little more
than a clash of intuitions. For example, in a prominent recent defense
of using consequentialist rather than deontological norms in policy
making, Professors Kaplow and Shavell point out that deontological
theories have the inherent capacity to justify policy choices that make
everyone worse off.1S8 They seem to think that this turn to the Pareto
principle makes a decisive rhetorical point-deontologists will agree
that policies that make everyone worse off are indefensible.
This rhetorical move, however, has less persuasive power than
its authors suppose. Consider, for instance, a research physician
convicted of murder and sentenced to death under a given
jurisdiction's prevailing law. Other experts credibly aver that the
convict has unique gifts and is on the threshold of major advances in
combating cancer or some other dread disease. Commuting the
sentence makes the doctor better off. It would also make all at risk of




the disease (and all who hold those at risk in some affection) better off.
Without expressing an opinion on the merits, I am fairly confident
that many reasonable minds would swallow the Paretian pill and say
"fiat justicia, coelum ruit."
18 9
By contrast, the psychological research invokes facts, not
values. Retributive theory basically asks human beings to characterize
the behavior of other human beings as harmful, responsible, and
inexcusable. Psychological research indicates that these judgments
will reflect the predispositions of those doing the judging as well as
genuine phenomena. I can imagine a determined retributivist saying
that some conduct deserves blame and that some institutional
arrangements can be devised to accurately identify these cases. But
without great confidence in these institutional arrangements,
retributive theory as applied by human judgment is very likely to
produce punishment in excess of its theoretical justification.
2. Virtue-Based Theories of Punishment
FAE also has troubling implications for theories of punishment
based on the promotion of virtuous character. 190 A character-based
virtue-ethics theory, leaving FAE aside for the moment, runs into the
debate, now ongoing among philosophers, about whether the
person/situation research forces us to surrender the very concept of
character traits, at least in the broad terms they have been
189. Cf. Kant, supra note 154, at 155.
The penal law is a categorical imperative, and woe betide anyone who winds
his way through the labyrinth of the theory of happiness in search of some
possible advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal from his punishment
or from any part of it, or who acts in the spirit of the pharisaical saying: "It is
better that one man should die than that the whole people should go to ruin."
For if justice perishes, there is no further point in men living on earth. What
then are we to think of the proposal that the life of a condemned criminal
should be spared if he agrees to let dangerous experiments be carried out on
him in order that the doctors may gain new information of value to the
commonwealth, and is fortunate enough to survive? A court of justice would
dismiss with contempt any medical institution which made such a proposal;
for justice ceases to be justice if it can be bought at a price.
Id.
190. Aristotle believed that a system of official punishment was necessary to foster virtuous
character. See ARISTOTLE, ETHICS 336-37 (J.A.K. Thompson trans., rev. ed., Penguin Books
1976). Responding to the objection that punishing character deficiencies is unjust because
character traits are not voluntarily chosen, Aristotle argued that at least some character flaws
are self-inflicted and thus justly subject to punishment. See id. at 124-26. For a modern defense




understood since Aristotle. 191 The psychologists have cast serious
doubt on the very existence of any cross-situational disposition as
broad as Blackstone's "vicious will."192 A virtue theory that did
describe traits defined narrowly enough to be recognized in the
psychological research, however, would have to account for an
unmanageably large number of predispositions. Imagine the virtue
theorist saying, "You are being punished for your unvirtuous
propensity to steal coins out of parking meters, at night, when
unwatched by the police, drunk, and broke."
The thief s bad character may not run any deeper or wider than
that predisposition. To treat such precisely defined dispositions as
proper predicates for punishment, however, would essentially reduce
the character-based scheme to a naked system of social control.
Moreover, a great many law-abiding people are simply lucky enough
to have avoided similarly precise situational triggers of bad behavior.
The focus on the offender's character therefore seems a highly
inappropriate basis for coercive intervention by the state.
Whether virtue-ethics of the character sort can support a
theory of punishment given the person/situation research, however, is
beside the point. A virtue-ethics approach to punishment depends not
only on the existence of character traits, but also on the ability of
observers to identify and evaluate traits. Put into practice, the result
would be systematically biased in favor of blaming people for
character traits they don't have. Observers committing FAE will
classify one who steals from parking meters at night while drunk and
broke simply as a thief or still more generally as dishonest. But the
disposition to steal from unguarded parking meters at night while
drunk is not the same as a predisposition to cheat on one's taxes or to
burglarize residences.
Any move to replace the inquiry into bad character with an
inquiry into the practical reasonableness of the accused's behavior, all
things considered,' 93 might well be still worse. Such an approach relies
191. Consider how broadly Aristotle defined the virtues and vices-"courage," as distinct
from "rashness" on the one hand or "cowardice" on the other, and so on. See ARISTOTLE, supra
note 190, at 104 (table of virtues and vices). Or consider how Professor Pincoffs describes the
relevant character traits: 'WXe have a moral right to demand-each of us of every other-honesty,
trustworthiness, justice, and other qualities as well." Pincoffs, supra note 190, at 919.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
193. If I understand him correctly, Professor Huigens favors this approach. See Kyron
Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1423, 1437-38 (1995).
The short answer is that inculpation, as an inquiry into a person's relation to
and responsibility for the greater good, is an inquiry into the person's
character-more particularly into the soundness, maturity and breadth of her
practical judgment, the faculty by which she assembles her conception of the
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very heavily on the tribunal's intuitive sense of justice.194 Social
cognition research teaches that such intuitive assessments of
blameworthiness are likely to be biased in favor of identifying the
choices of the accused, rather than the context, as the key link in the
causal sequence.
195
In a fascinating illustration of FAE in operation, Professor
Huigens, defending a virtue-ethics approach, argues for full
consideration of battered-women's syndrome evidence. 196 Here, with
another human being to blame, 197 Professor Huigens can see some
room for excuse; at the same time he categorizes criminal behavior by
the addicted198 or the unlucky or the stupid 99 as culpable failures of
practical reasonableness. He is, as we have seen, far from alone in
good and her scheme of ends. If we take virtue to be, at bottom, this sort of
exemplary practical judgment, then inculpation is a judgment on virtue.
Id.
194. See id. at 1462-65 (discussing "Virtue as a Jury Question").
195. Professor Huigens acknowledges the legal constraints on jury decision making, but
nonetheless maintains that "[iun the hard case, the jury acts as I have described it above: each
member comparing the accused's choices with what she believes her own would be in the
situation of the accused." Id. at 1466. If the psychologists deliberately set out to frame an
inquiry which would give FAE maximum influence, they could hardly do better.
196. Kyron Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and Theories of Punishment: A Response
to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23-28 (2002).
197. Professor Huigens begins a major article with this quotation, attributed to a prison
warden in Michigan:
Frequently, someone who's committed pre-meditated murder, which in
Michigan is how you get life with no possibility of parole, is not a good problem
solver. They have elected to kill someone as a solution to a problem that
they've identified. But now that that person is dead, the problem is
resolved .....
"I caught a case." It's like they went fishing and it just leaped on their line or
something. They didn't commit a crime. They don't frame it that way.
They're a victim. And it's incredible to me when you know the kinds of crimes
that some of these fellows have committed, that they still do not see the person
that they brutalized as the victim. They see themselves as a victim.
Huigens, supra note 193, at 1423 (citation omitted). Note how both the warden and Professor
Huigens easily pick up the attribution error of the murderers. Both the professor and the
warden then turn about and attribute crime to person rather than situation. The murderer is a
poor "problem solver" who "elected to kill." The construction of blame-worthy character defects
from the fact of antisocial behavior is easy, perhaps even natural. The psychological research,
however, suggests that this tendency to blame people rather than circumstances is at best
exaggerated.
198. See Huigens, supra note 196, at 20-21 ("Because it breaks down the hard distinction
between retribution and the pursuit of social welfare, the aretaic theory of punishment enables
us to see drug treatment courts as an integrated part of the punishment system, and not as an
alternative to punishment that necessarily slights desert and retribution.").
199. See Huigens, supra note 193, at 1476 ("Inculpation is premised on that responsibility for
the good, not on the more narrow responsibility to avoid harm. One can therefore act culpably
while being unaware of the particular risk one has created.").
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embracing the "abuse excuse" while giving short shrift to situational
excusing circumstances such as necessity and intoxication. 20
0
3. Utilitarian Accounts
FAE complicates matters for utilitarians as well. The standard
counter to the charge that utilitarianism permits punishing the
innocent, cruel punishments, or strict liability, is that any system that
permitted such practices would do more harm than good and therefore
be inconsistent with utilitarianism.201 Thus the utilitarian theorist
typically builds such ideas as culpability and proportionality into the
theory as side-constraints limiting the pursuit of overall utility in an
individual case. 202 If culpability and proportionality are likely to be
applied badly in a retributive system, these concepts are just as
vulnerable to FAE when incorporated into utilitarian accounts as side-
constraints.
The utilitarian theory of punishment may still have an
advantage in practice. Retributive theory, at least in its mandatory
form, regards punishment as a positive good; utilitarian theory
requires that punishment be justified by expected future returns. To
the extent that observers systematically tend to exaggerate the degree
of culpable wrongdoing, retributivism inherently tends toward
punishment that is excessive by whatever rational criteria any
particular retributivist might select. Considerations of utility,
however, might frequently point in the direction of punishing less
than retributive theory might require. For example, a utilitarian
skeptical about the marginal deterrent effect of executions and
concerned about the cost and delay attending the capital-sentencing
process might very well oppose the death penalty while a retributivist
in the mold of Kant might support it.203
A utilitarian theory that incorporates retributive principles as
side-constraints is vulnerable to punishing as much as retributive
theory permits, but no more. The culpability side-constraint will be
expanded by FAE, but within the constraint, the utilitarian will be
seeking ways to inflict less pain on offenders so long as deterrence and
restraint are adequately served. By contrast, retributive theory,
applied by observers peering through the magnifying glass of FAE,
200. See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., HART, supra note 163, at 8-13; John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL.
REV. 3 (1955).
202. See HART, supra note 163, at 8-13.
203. Compare Kant, supra note 154, with BECCARIA, supra note 157.
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may call for "proportionate" punishment for culpable wrongdoing even
when no social advantage is thereby gained.
To take but one example, there is general agreement that the
sexual abuse of children is a terrible thing that society has every right
to prevent, by force if necessary. In these cases, however, the divide
between the two theories can be stark. Given the seriousness of the
offense, retributivism counsels terrible penalties. The utilitarian,
however, is free to ask whether long-term restraint outside the regular
prison system might satisfy the needs of social control at less cost, in
both dollars and misery.
More generally, utilitarian theories seem to fit the facts of
human behavior better than retributive theories. The utilitarian
intends punishment to change future situations by deterring or
restraining harmful conduct. The utilitarian's primary focus is on the
future, not the past. She will administer punishment with an eye on
how persons other than the defendant will respond to an environment
in which they may expect to be punished for similar conduct.
On some debates, one does not really expect to change many
minds. Still, this latter attitude-of inflicting the least amount of
punishment that will serve the purposes of social control, in a spirit of
sad necessity-comports better with what we know of situational
determinants of behavior and the tendency to ascribe behavior to
personality. If modern psychological research correctly describes these
phenomena, the retributivists' deliberate infliction of pain in an open
spirit of moral superiority will be counterfactual in a great many
cases.
Of course, if it were possible to neutralize cognitive biases in
assessing blame, the theoretical debate would remain in its present
state. But if both families of justifications for punishment run a
serious risk of overassessing individual blameworthiness, it might be
time to move the theoretical debate away from what a perfect theory
of punishment requires, and toward the design of institutions that
would minimize the irrational application of whatever theory of
punishment prevails at the moment.
VI. ANTICIPATING Two PLAUSIBLE CRITICISMS
In other contexts, two plausible criticisms have been made of
the use of psychological research for purposes of analyzing legal rules
and institutions. One criticism has been to interpret the turn to
behavioral science as an attempt to qualify the microeconomist's
rational-actor assumption, and to defend traditional law-and-
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economics analysis against this perceived attack. 204 The other has
been to point out that both behavior and cognition have multiple and
complex causes, that it is a mistake to abstract a particular cognitive
bias or behavioral tendency from others, and that lawyers are too
quick to pounce on research findings that can be adapted to ulterior
doctrinal purposes. 20 5 I shall refer to the first criticism as the
"rational-actor assumption" and the second as the "law-office
psychology criticism. 206
Whatever the merits of the rational-actor assumption in other
contexts (and they are considerable), 20 7 this Article has dealt with
decisions made by officials in the criminal-justice system. The system
makes a major and substantially successful effort to distance these
officials from considerations of immediate self-interest that rational-
actor assumptions generally consider to motivate individuals. Bribes
are forbidden, federal judges serve for good behavior, state judges
serve long terms, and jurors in the vast bulk of cases have no stake in
the outcome worth considering. This is not to say that rational-actor
assumptions don't have explanatory power in the criminal-justice
context, only that the power of self-interest to offset other impulses
will be less in this context than in others.
Moreover, there are many strands of current criminal-justice
doctrine that are hard to explain solely on rational-actor grounds.
Legislators, presumably following or sharing the views of their
constituents, generally declined the Model Penal Code's opportunity to
equate attempt with success-an equation tailor-made for law-and-
204. See generally Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (defending rational-actor assumption against behavioral
economics); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1603 (2000) (arguing that modifying rational-actor assumption may deepen analysis but
reduce its predictive power).
205. See Mitchell, supra note 21, at 1912 ("When the full range of empirical research into
judgment and decision making is considered, and when the methodological assumptions and
choices of this research are laid bare, it becomes clear that this body of research does not present
an unqualified account of pervasive and systematic irrationality.").
206. The phrase is a play on the well-known jibes of professional historians against "law
office history." See, e.g., Martin H. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 525 (1995) ("[Clonstitutional discourse is replete with
historical assertions that are at best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers."); Alfred H. Kelly,
Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 122-32.
207. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, the Theory of Public
Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1079 (1993) (arguing that public choice theory, founded on rational-actor assumption,
accurately predicts legislative hostility to rights of the accused); Donald A. Dripps, Living With
Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986) (arguing that costs of obtaining search warrant, independent of
deterrent influence of exclusionary rule, give rational police strong disincentive to seeking
warrants not supported by probable cause).
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order politicians and a godsend to prosecutors seeking extra leverage
in plea bargaining.20 8 Nor does self-interest, springing from fear of
crime, explain the narrowing of the insanity defense following the
Hinckley case,209 given that civil commitment follows acquittals. If
politicians were responding to widespread political passion in that
instance, what explains the political passion? Not, I submit, the risk
that waves of gunmen would now dare to murder in the hope that,
once acquitted, each could spend the rest of his days at St. Elizabeth's.
The examples could be multiplied, but I think these two give some
evidence that FAE may have something to do with the shape of the
law.
As to the law-office psychology objection, I am in no position to
deny it. Either I have digested the psychological literature more-or-
less correctly, or I haven't, and only those better versed in that
literature can assess the degree to which I have or haven't. In the
range of cognitive strategies recognized in the literature, it is hard to
think of one that would oppose the operation of FAE with any
consistency, and if there were such a strategy it should have shown up
in the classic experiments on attribution. Moreover, FAE, unlike some
of the other biases studied in the literature, seems to have a
substantial effect size. 210 Still, I would be a poor scholar indeed if I
didn't advise the reader that I am an academic lawyer, not a
psychologist (or an economist, or a moral philosopher, or a historian-
though I have found taking a position on economic, philosophical, and
historical issues unavoidable in prior work). Nor has my argument
aimed at any particular policy conclusion; it may be wrong, but it is
ingenuous.
One more point deserves to be made about the law-office
psychology objection. To the extent that FAE does have explanatory
power about criminal justice, it suggests that my interpretation of the
psychological dynamics is not misplaced. If FAE helps to explain legal
practices that otherwise are hard to explain, those practices in turn
tend to confirm that observers are inclined to attribute conduct and its
consequences to the person rather than the situation.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has not endorsed (or opposed) any specific
doctrinal reforms. Instead, it has sought to explore how pervasive
208. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
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tendencies of human cognition might affect official decisions in the
criminal justice process. Multiple influences bear on each of these
choices, and many criminal justice decisions, such as those made by
legislators, are collective rather than individual. It follows that FAE is
unlikely to be a necessary and sufficient explanation for any
particular rule or practice in the system.
FAE does have at least one, highly general, doctrinal
implication. We should be wary of defining criminal liability in terms
of standards that appeal to intuitive judgments about personal
responsibility. Human beings are predisposed to give affirmative
answers to questions about personal responsibility. This is not to say
that standards might never be the best formulation, all things
considered; but it does suggest that lawmakers should leave
catastrophic judgments of blameworthiness to intuition only when
more specific formulations are clearly unworkable.
FAE helps to explain a great many puzzles in criminal law,
such as the success/attempt distinction and the relative success
enjoyed by the "abuse excuse." FAE also sheds some light on the
theoretical divide between retributive and utilitarian accounts. On
that front, I have expressed a certain sympathy for the utilitarian
approach, which seems far more consistent with the evidence about
human behavior and less susceptible to the risk of translating
cognitive tendencies into years in the penitentiary.
The theoretical debate, moreover, may very well be seen as of
much greater practical importance in light of FAE. Many actors in the
criminal justice process come to a pragmatic accommodation of
utilitarian and retributive theories after repeatedly finding that they
rarely conflict in actual cases. What, however, if this happy
coincidence turns out to be the product of irrational overassessments
of blameworthiness? In that case, considerations of social control
would counsel harsher punishment than rational considerations of
retributive justice allow. FAE might be functional, precisely because it
permits useful behavior modifications that ingrained notions of justice
would forbid if rationally applied. If that is so, and if it were possible
to counteract FAE across the system, we would need to resolve the
theoretical dispute before we could decide important policy issues.
Given the stubbornness of FAE it may well be a long time before the
peaceful coexistence of utilitarian and retributive theories in practice
is disrupted.
It may turn out, then, that not all of our predispositions are
dysfunctional. Consider how FAE magnifies the satisfaction attending
personal achievement, thereby maximizing pro-social incentive effects.
Upon concluding prior articles I have taken a certain pride (no more
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than most academics, I expect, but a healthy measure nonetheless) in
having advanced a novel and plausible approach to some challenging
problem. This Article is different. In this case, I must attribute my
contribution to the coincidence that, unlike most teachers of criminal
law, I also teach evidence, a field in which FAE has been identified as
a possible justification for the character evidence rules.211 In light of
this somewhat peculiar situation, it seems unsurprising (and
unimpressive) that I should have connected the psychological research
current in the evidence literature to recurring issues in criminal law.
Thinking along these lines really might undermine an
individual's-or a system's-commitment to the free-will assumption.
Success and failure alike might be seen as undeserved, a
characterization that would discourage personal forbearance in the
pursuit of valued ends. To have this effect, however, the self-conscious
recognition of FAE would need to go beyond what the evidence
supports. Empirical evidence suggests that we overestimate the causal
significance of personal forbearance, but it does not teach that self-
control makes no difference at all. Blame and praise are more than
useful conventions.
At any rate, as between the risks that accompany pretending to
exercise a fuller rationality than we possess, and the risks that
accompany admitting the probable distortions in our judgments of
blame and praise, the balance inclines in favor of persevering in the
direction of fully rational judgments. 212 In the actual practice of
criminal justice, we frequently give legal force to intuitive judgments
of personal responsibility, and this practice is approved by many
strands of both popular theory and prevailing practice. But our
intuitions about blame are not to be trusted. What criminal law
reformers can learn from the research on FAE-and it may be all we
can learn from it-is that we should reach judgments of blame with as
much humility as possible.
211. This assumes that the piece has at least some positive value. Should it become an
embarrassment-held up to the untenured as a model of the risks of writing out-of-field or in an
interdisciplinary way without the right background-I shall probably come to the view that my
colleagues should have convinced me not to publish it, that the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW editors
should have rejected it, or whatnot. Cf. supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
212. Cf. Posner, supra note 204, at 1575 ("One might have thought that behavioral
economics had at least one clear normative implication: that efforts should be made through
education and perhaps psychiatry to cure the cognitive quirks and weakness of will that prevent
people from acting rationally with no offsetting gains.").
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